

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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CHARTING A NEW COURSE IN FOREIGN AID • <i>Address by Secretary Rusk</i>	747
THE NEW FRONTIER AND THE NEW NATIONS • by <i>Under Secretary Ball</i>	751
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MAY 4	756
ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS VS. COMMUNISM • <i>Remarks by Adolf A. Berle</i>	763
AFRICA—HOPES AND CONTRADICTIONS • by Eleanor <i>Lansing Dulles</i>	767
CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION HOLDS NINTH MINISTERIAL MEETING • Statements by Secretary <i>Rusk and Text of Final Communique</i>	778

For index see inside back cover

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

Charting a New Course in Foreign Aid

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

I am grateful for this chance to talk to the leaders of American business about some of the decisions facing us as we move into the decade of the sixties. Some of these we can make ourselves; some will be made by others. Together they will have far-reaching effect upon our future; they may determine issues of war and peace, freedom and tyranny, and the prospects for a decent world order.

My remarks will center around foreign aid—at a time when the London *Economist* says that there is desperate need for “the idealism of the old world to redress the aid-weariness of the new.” I do not propose just now to talk about particular amounts of money for specific purposes; that will come later when the Congress and the public take up the President’s proposals² for discussion.

What concerns me this evening is not a certain number of dollars but whether we make history or submit to it, whether we retreat into our dreams or stir to realize them. For the decade of the sixties will see decisions made which will have a great deal to do with the shape of our world for the rest of this century.

I would suppose that some of these are:

Whether the established and productive societies of the West can combine their efforts to create a world environment of expanding freedoms and productivity essential to their own security and well-being.

Whether the Western World can build effective ties of genuine partnership with peoples of other areas, races, cultures, and circumstances.

¹ Made before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce at Washington, D.C., on May 3 (press release 286).

² For text of the President’s message to Congress on foreign aid, see BULLETIN of Apr. 10, 1961, p. 507.

Whether the large number of newly independent nations can find solutions for their urgent problems through free institutions or will succumb to the trap of totalitarian methods baited by the promise of rapid development.

Whether governments of those living in misery and want can evoke their primary asset, i.e. the energies of the peoples themselves dedicated to the task of making the sixties a decade of progress.

Whether we ourselves can find the talent, the persistence, the sophistication, and the tact to labor with others, in the words of the United Nations Charter, “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”

Whether troubled mankind can spin more effectively “the infinity of threads which bind peace together” in common tasks which make natural allies of us all.

Basic Objectives of Extending Aid

My questions have had little to do with military matters. We face formidable military threats and shall need the combined arms of the free world to meet them. Surely we must not learn all over again that weakness can tempt aggression. Our foreign aid program includes military aid to help in building the common defense. But a primary task of policy is to support our purposes and build a decent world order by peaceful means if possible. Power is not a matter of arms alone. Strength comes from education, fertile acres, humming workshops, and the satisfaction and pride of peoples. A vibrant society is not subject to subversion; determined defense is the easier when there is something to defend.

Nor have I emphasized the threat of communism. The threat is there, but foreign aid has more

solemn purposes. In presenting the plan which bore his name Secretary George Marshall put it: "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."²

It seems to me that, as we look back over the past two decades, we have lost sight of the words of George Marshall. The aid programs of these two decades have been the creature of crisis and rapidly changing events, and the original Marshall concept has become blurred.

Foreign aid started with China in 1938 as military aid and became the great wartime weapon of lend-lease. But even before the war was over, we began a program of relief to war-ravaged regions—a noble international effort known as UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration].

From relief we moved on to the historic Truman doctrine aid, which saved Greece and Turkey from military subversion, and from there to economic assistance, with a program that reached its pinnacle in the Marshall plan—not only one of the most dramatic strokes in history but also one of the most successful.

With the dawning of the 1950's came a new awareness of the needs of the underdeveloped nations and the inauguration of the point 4 technical assistance program. At the same time, however, we became increasingly preoccupied with building the military strength of the free world. The NATO treaty among the North Atlantic nations was followed in later years by the SEATO and the CENTO treaties. We formed a network of military bases throughout the world, and a massive military aid program that began in Europe soon became global in scope. In the later fifties the technique of bringing about economic development through long-term loans to underdeveloped areas was introduced into our aid program with the establishment of the Development Loan Fund.

The challenge now before us is different in character from that of the past. We must provide military assistance, but the larger task is only indirectly related to immediate security problems. It is concerned with preventing them. Unlike disaster relief, it is long-range in nature. Unlike the Marshall plan, it deals with nations which lack the governmental traditions, the industrial base, and the trained manpower of a modern economy.

² *Ibid.*, June 15, 1947, p. 1159.

As we enter the decade of the sixties we have an opportunity to stand back a bit, to learn from our experience of the past two decades, and to chart a more effective and intelligent course for the future.

Lessons of the Past

What are the principal lessons to be learned?

The first is that, if our aid is to be effective, we must have clear targets and objectives and a careful plan for achieving them. Too often in the past our aid has been governed less by the priorities of a well-planned program than by the needs and pressures of the moment: the need to preserve an alliance or friendship or protect an American military base; or the desire to counter a Communist aid offer or save an economy from imminent collapse. These needs were urgent; to some extent they will persist. But aid granted in this fashion is not necessarily best suited to the fostering of long-term development and the attainment of self-sustaining growth which will free nations of the need for outside assistance. This must be the paramount goal in the granting of aid in the sixties.

The attainment of that goal will require a carefully thought-out, long-range development effort in each country assisted. This bears directly on the second lesson of the past: that economic development is not an overnight matter. It is a time-consuming process that requires the steady application of resources and energy. It will not be achieved by hesitating, and sometimes spasmodic, annual steps. The yearly authorization and appropriations processes which govern the present aid program are simply not suited to the long-term economic development task of the sixties.

Third, we must recognize that the capital and financial assistance that brought such brilliant success to the Marshall plan is not, by itself, adequate to the requirements of the sixties. The Marshall plan countries were highly developed, with mature governments and institutions, skilled and literate people. Today, however, we are primarily concerned with assisting nations which lack the governmental experience, the industrial base, or the trained manpower of a modern economy. Hence we are talking about total development—the building of a nation from its very foundations. Especially is this true of the newly emerging nations.

A fourth lesson is that various types of assistance—loans, grants, technical assistance, food, and so forth—must be coordinated and administered by a single agency of the government. The aid programs of the past decade have been the creatures of unfolding and rapidly changing events, and today foreign assistance is administered by a variety of agencies. Clearly this is not the way to make the most effective use of each aid dollar.

Finally, we have learned that assistance is not likely to achieve its purposes if it is unconcerned with social objectives, if it merely serves to enrich the rich and perpetuate the gap between rich and poor that breeds discontent and revolt. The impoverished of centuries are awakening to the knowledge that a better life *can* be theirs. Social justice is an imperative of the 1960's. The fostering of social justice must, therefore, be a major objective of our aid programs—not because we wish to interfere, not because we wish to dictate, but simply because we wish our aid to be effective.

In charting our course for the sixties we must, I believe, return to the words of George Marshall and follow the goal he enunciated 14 years ago. The purpose of our aid program, he said, "should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

This is precisely the goal of the new aid effort which President Kennedy has proposed to the Congress. It seeks to take advantage of the lessons of the past two decades and to chart a new course for the future.

Cardinal Points of New Aid Program

The cardinal points of this new program are:

First, improved and efficient administration. Under the President's proposal the existing aid programs now being administered by separate agencies will be brought under one roof, under a single director.

Second, long-term financing. The heart of President Kennedy's new program is his request for authority to make commitments for development loans over a 5-year period rather than on the year-by-year basis under which the aid program has been operating. This is essential to making the most effective use of each aid dollar. It is a necessity if the new aid administrator is to—

relate our assistance to long-range country plans for the attainment of self-sustaining economic growth;

elicit maximum self-help efforts from those assisted;

stimulate long-term help from other industrialized nations in a partnership effort to assist the underdeveloped areas of the world.

To achieve these ends the President has asked Congress for authority to borrow funds from the Treasury over a 5-year period. He has chosen this method of long-term financing for the aid program principally because it has proved effective in some 22 existing lending programs of the Federal Government, including many you know well and support, such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and, in the international field, the Export-Import Bank.

This is not a new proposal in the aid field. President Eisenhower recommended borrowing authority for the Development Loan Fund in 1957.⁴ Nor will this deprive Congress of control over the aid program. All of the nonlending aspects of the program will continue to be subject to the usual appropriation procedures, which will afford Congress a full opportunity to review the entire aid program.

The third cardinal point of the new aid program is a strong effort by those assisted. This involves not only the use of their own resources but programs of social reform and the fostering of social justice. The granting of long-term commitment authority bears directly on this point, for these self-help efforts will call for sacrifice on the part of recipient nations—sacrifices they may be reluctant to make in the absence of assurances by us and others of long-term assistance. Conversely, if we are unwilling to make a moderate adjustment in our method of financing the aid program, many countries may wonder why they should take much more radical and difficult steps.

Fourth, the new aid effort will not be solely an American effort. It will be a partnership effort in which all of the industrial nations of the world will join.

The Senate has recently approved United States participation in an Atlantic grouping of nations

⁴For text of President Eisenhower's message to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for 1958, see *ibid.*, June 10, 1957, p. 920.

known as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—or OECD.⁵ One of the principal functions of this Organization is to coordinate the aid programs of the various member nations and to work toward formulas of equitable sharing of the task of helping the underdeveloped nations of the world. We have recently had one meeting on this subject with our industrialized friends in which an excellent start was made.⁶ Procedures for aid coordination were established, a start was made on the question of burden sharing, and our allies agreed to the naming of an American chairman to head the OECD organization. Another such meeting is scheduled to take place in July.

The "Rightness" of Foreign Aid

In his inaugural address President Kennedy said:

To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right.

It is right because the per capita output in the underdeveloped countries is about one-twentieth of what it is in America; because 65 percent of the peoples of these areas are illiterate, compared to our 2 percent; because infant mortality is six times greater, life expectancy a little more than half. It is right because misery is a challenge to the best there is in us, because the responsibilities we accept are privileges, because we are the kind of people we are.

Foreign aid would be impelling were there no Sino-Soviet bloc, backing with energy and power their doctrine of world revolution. But the bloc is there, and what would be impelling becomes a matter of life and death for freedom itself. Beginning in the midfifties the bloc has moved into economic and technical assistance, with increas-

ingly large resources and with considerable effect. They have found a device by which they hope to leap over or outflank the bastions of the free world and a means for pressing their campaign into every continent.

I recall, some years ago, a consultation with a distinguished Senator about an early aid program. Having heard the proposal he said, "We must do this, but if you want this kind of money you'll have to come in here roaring." Roar we did, but the roaring was discordant; it confused our purposes, misrepresented our motives, and impaired our execution.

Vigorous public debate is vital to our democracy, but we could add great strength to our position if we could decide as a nation that foreign aid is a national necessity of the greatest moment in this period of dramatic historical change, that we accept it as a long-term commitment and give our President our steady and quiet support for this instrument of action in a troubled and dangerous world.

Vice President Johnson To Tour South and Southeast Asia

Press release 295 dated May 6

Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson will leave Andrews Air Force Base on May 9 for a 2-week tour of south and southeast Asia.

On May 10 he will stop at Honolulu, Hawaii, where he will speak at dedication ceremonies for the East-West Center.

After Hawaii, the Vice President will arrive at Saigon, Capital of south Viet-Nam, on May 11. There he will confer with President Ngo Dinh Diem on steps that may be necessary to assist south Viet-Nam to maintain its independence.

The Vice President will visit Manila on May 13 and Taipei on May 14 for high-level talks with officials of the Governments of the Philippines and the Republic of China.

In addition the Vice President will visit other capitals of south and southeast Asia. Details of the itinerary will be made available as soon as they have been confirmed.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1961, p. 8; Mar. 6, 1961, p. 326; Apr. 10, 1961, p. 514.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1961, p. 553.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

The New Frontier and the New Nations

by Under Secretary Ball¹

I note that your main preoccupations this year are "the social aspects of development, both as the basis of growth and as the desired end product." I shall deal with nothing so profound. I shall merely try to sketch the broad political and procedural aspects of the pragmatic policies we intend to adopt in the 1960's.

As a lonely lawyer fallen among economists I shall, as a conditioned reflex, emphasize the institutional approach. For even in a time of revolutionary change, of the melting away of old forms and formulas, new institutions must be built, and quickly. New procedures must evolve under pressure, else we shall find no way to organize, to channel into productive activity, a world of desperate energies that threaten to explode.

I appear before you this evening with enormous diffidence. You gentlemen are the acknowledged experts, the new priesthood, of the arcane social science of economic growth. Before this evening is over I know I will have learned more from you, on a subject that concerns all of us, than you can possibly learn from me. But perhaps, together, we can drive some nails with heads on them.

Some of you may have read recently a little how-not-to-do-it item in this field of institutional change. It was published in the 1961 United Nations *Report on the World Social Situation*.²

The danger is that the more obvious but less relevant features [of institutional change] will be taken as the fundamental ones for economic development. The Pacific islanders who destroyed their ceremonial masks and regalia, organized their houses in rows like military

encampments and marched up and down with sticks, in the hope of achieving the kind of wealth that they had witnessed among foreign military [personnel] stationed on the island during the Second World War, may have perceived correctly the general principle of the need for institutional change but erred in the application.

In the whole field of applied social science there is probably no task more complex than to accelerate what has come to be called, perhaps a bit too simply, "economic growth." It is a new field in which the economist, the historian, the sociologist, and indeed the anthropologist can and must consult together in what is called, in the horrid jargon of the trade, "interdisciplinary" effort.

Research was really only beginning to probe deeply into the phenomenon of growth in our own industrial society when, suddenly, we were confronted with the need to stretch new concepts and theorems to cover a heretofore unexplored world—the teeming world of new nations, and old nations suddenly awakened from centuries of sleep.

The anatomy of economic growth is complex, as the growing literature on the subject indicates. You gentlemen are only too well aware of this literature; if you have not yet read it, you have, at least, written it. It covers a multitude of problems—the problem of how to develop skills and know-how, how to create savings, promote investment, diversify economic activity, make the best use of creative capital, and so forth.

The Task of the 1960's

But tonight, with all this elegant learning as a backdrop to our thinking, I choose rather to turn to the immediate and practical reality of the measures which the free world must take in the interest, pure and simple, of its own survival. For the 1960's will be not only a decade of de-

¹Address made before the Society for International Development at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 28 (press release 272).

²U.N. doc. E/CN.5/346.

velopment; it will also be a decade of decision. If, for example, during the next 10 years we can help bring certain of the major developing nations over the hump into self-sustaining growth, then we of the Western industrial world will have widened the area of freedom for over a half-billion people—freedom from the soul-crushing slavery of poverty.

But if we should fail—and if we organize this Gulliver task with Lilliputian hearts we shall fail—then tyranny would take over and try to organize the chaos. Without doing too much violence to the calendar of history, we can say that the task of the 1960's is to prevent the arrival of a "1984."

Foreign economic assistance, in one form or another, has been a part of the American political landscape since the end of the war. The Marshall plan, point 4, military assistance, mutual security—you know the story.

In domestic politics—which after all is where the voters are—a disquieting picture has grown up of Uncle Sam as a kind of softheaded dogooder, going around the world pouring the milk of human kindness into bottles and leaving one on each doorstep. Comparisons with the highly successful Marshall plan, for example, are often heard today in nagging criticism of the less evident results in the field of foreign aid through the decade of the 1950's.

But the whole analogy is false. Under the Marshall plan we were supplying the plasma of our dollars on a short-term, emergency basis. We were dealing with nations which are some of the most advanced and sophisticated in the world, nations with evolved industrial traditions, great reservoirs of skills and know-how, and populations long familiar with industrial and civic disciplines.

Our task was to provide the necessary margin of resources to enable them to get on with the job themselves. And they promptly did. Our American dollar aid, while large in absolute figures, was only about 13 percent of the total investment which those nations themselves were able to mobilize.

But the task of the 1960's is utterly different. Today we are dealing with a variety of new states in the uncommitted world which, while they often differ one from the other, have many things in common. Yet they have little in com-

mon with the advanced economies of Western Europe, the chief clients of the Marshall plan. The new nations lack, or possess in only rudimentary form, the basic prerequisites of a modern industrial society.

As we look out on the world of the 1960's, a world on the march, the swiftest movement is on the continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There are 3 billion people in our world today, and more than half of them are on those old continents, so suddenly come alive. It is in those once somnolent areas that the excitement, the yeast of change, is everywhere in the air. Men for the first time in millennia are no longer content to plod in the hopeless furrows of their fathers and grandsires.

But why then is it that the 1960's—why precisely is it that this particular decade is so critical, indeed decisive? Why cannot a second industrial revolution move, step by step, over a span of several generations as did the first—that iron smithy where our own industrial society was slowly, laboriously forged? Why is this coming decade so impatient?

It is, I suppose, because our vaulting technology has altered the dimensions of time. The sands are pouring so much faster through the hourglass of history. Time is racing. As the Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans break through the circle of frustration, as this process now gets under way, violent stresses and strains are appearing. This is the critical, forced-pace period when skills must be acquired, technical and managerial know-how developed, and capital accumulated.

This is the period, also, when dislocations in the society are greatest and before the stage is reached when, at long last, standards of living visibly rise and people can begin to see with their own eyes that they are on the march toward better things, toward "the tomorrows that sing"—the breakthrough, in short, to self-sustaining growth.

Our task is to speed up and make easier this early development process, to move as many nations, as quickly as possible, through the critical period. Our Communist adversaries know that this early period, this time of maximum troubles and growing pains, is the moment of their greatest chance to foment chaos. They can be counted upon to exert maximum disruptive effort, to exploit the strains and stresses inherent in social change. The Communist aim is to subvert the

process, capture the revolutions, and use temporary turbulence to achieve all-out control.

To accomplish our objectives will not be easy. We shall need to commit large resources—and over a long period of time. We cannot, nor should we, undertake this task alone. The dozen or more advanced nations in the free world must organize their combined resources to do the job. Nor is there time to spare, for speed is of the essence and the race will be to the swift.

I shall concentrate the remainder of my remarks tonight on two limited aspects of the total task:

1. How does the free world best organize for the tasks ahead, and
2. What are some of the hard issues that must be faced in the coming years?

Free-World Teamwork

First, as to free-world teamwork in the 1960's. It is fortunate, indeed, that economic power has rapidly grown in our own Western World. As a result in part of our Marshall plan efforts the United States is no longer the lonely Mount Everest among the nations of the West. Today we are *primus inter pares*, the largest giant in a world of giants.

Hence we need no longer attempt by ourselves to undertake the entire task of financing economic development. Our friends in Europe are aware of this fact. And they are in agreement that the economically advanced countries should combine their strength for the task of development, just as they now combine their strength through NATO to maintain the common defense.

But this kind of international cooperation depends on an effective mechanism. Such a mechanism exists today in the form of DAG, the Development Assistance Group. One of our first tasks as a new administration has been to try to give new impetus to the work of DAG. Toward this end, 1 month ago in London I attended a meeting of DAG in which several major steps were taken.³

The group by resolution explicitly recognized that the development task was a joint responsibility of all the member countries. They agreed that this task should be shared in relation to the capacity of each country. And they also agreed

to the naming of a full-time chairman of the DAG, to be nominated by the United States. It will be the chairman's role to give guidance and leadership to the work of this group.

The Major Issues

I come now to the second and more difficult question: What are the major issues that the advanced industrial nations must face in assisting the process of development in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

Certain of these issues are easily identified. How may a developing country most effectively utilize the resources allocated to it? Is it necessary for it to design an overall development plan? And how can we help in this process? What is the effect of development of a new nation on the pattern and flow of world trade? Is there a close relationship between the aid and trade concepts? And have we given sufficient thought to the crucial role of world markets in our development planning? Finally, how may aid and trade policies between advanced countries and the emerging ones be harmonized to realize the maximum economic and political benefits from reallocation of global resources?

I need not tell you how many complex and difficult judgments must be made by a developing country in determining the best use of aid resources. It is easy enough, to take one example, to decide that resources should be used on the basis of the "comparative advantage" which that country enjoys in order to maximize real income, employment, and living standards. But comparative advantage is not a static condition; it changes along with the processes of development itself.

In planning terms this implies a necessity of judgment as to what the changing pattern of comparative advantage will be now and in the future, as well as the determination of demand patterns over all the world—not only now but in the future as well. Yet predictions as to the pattern of future demands are hazardous indeed. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a country providing aid to determine its real impact on the economy of the recipient country. To a considerable degree resources are fungible. Agreements as to the use of aid funds and, in many cases, aid directed toward certain activities free internal resources for other uses.

For example, if a recipient country agrees to

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 17, 1961, p. 553.

employ aid resources for certain infrastructure items such as roads, harbors, and schools, it may then elect to employ its internal resources to expand the production of items that may well be in glut in world markets. It is very necessary to prevent distortion of resource allocation. Much must be left to ordinary market forces. Our limited objective should be, first, to avoid obvious mistakes and duplications and, second, to prevent as many distortions in the comparative advantage scheme as possible.

Given these limitations, we feel that much can be achieved by focusing on well-developed country plans. President Kennedy's recent aid message⁴ is quite clear on this point.

We shall have to fashion techniques for coordinating country plans in a multilateral fashion. Much more should be done to promote intraregional coordination. For, with the growth of new and more efficient agricultural and industrial production in the less developed nations, we have already noticed the tendency for uneconomic duplication and wasteful paralleling of effort.

Let me give you an example. The comparative advantage for the manufacture of bottle tops may rapidly shift from advanced countries to less developed ones. But it would make no sense for each less developed country in, say, Latin America to build its own bottle-top factory. Since there is a similar tendency for each country to build its own bottle factory and to erect trade barriers against both bottle tops and bottles from other countries, the obvious conclusion is that rational planning would call for the building of bottle-top factories in some countries and for bottle manufacture in others.

I am sure more research and planning will pay off in this field. It should enable us to take greater advantage of the opportunities that will arise as agricultural and industrial production grow in the now less developed nations. If our economic aid brings about such a rise, particularly in agriculture and labor-intensive light manufacture, markets must be found for these products. In short, we must devise measures that will facilitate a gradual and orderly shift in resources in the advanced countries—a shift that is in process in any event—away from such activities and to others having a higher technological and scientific input.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Apr. 10, 1961, p. 507.

To put it bluntly, it makes no sense to provide economic aid for the development of new industries and then, through trade barriers, prevent the emerging countries from having access to markets in which to sell their wares.

While we need to study and to coordinate efforts to lower trade barriers, it must be recognized that for the less developed countries there is some merit in the old, and to you quite familiar, "infant industry" argument. What needs to be avoided, however, is the more flagrant resource misallocation which leads to industrial "adult infantilism." What I have in mind are industries for which no rational economic base exists either in the present or in the foreseeable future.

The developing countries, of course, will not enter the industrial age overnight. Income from primary commodity exports will constitute the overwhelming source of foreign-exchange earnings for many of these countries for a good many years to come. The instability of this income presents major problems, while lagging trade and declining prices in commodities have been persistent for many years. Leadership toward a solution in this area is not only imperative if our economic aid efforts are not to be frustrated; it also provides us with a golden opportunity to demonstrate our genuine concern and our willingness to play a part in facing up to the problem.

Market expansion is one of several ways to attack this problem. For example, there are still a number of industrially advanced countries who put a heavy consumption tax on commodities such as coffee and tea. Ways must be found to induce these countries to lift such consumption taxes.

The commitment to assist the industrial tooling up of the less developed countries, together with the emphasis we place on finding outlets for goods produced in those countries, stands in revealing opposition to a tenacious dogma of Marxist ideology. The Communists have always said, and persist in saying, that it is the interest and intention of the capitalist world to keep these nations of Asia and Africa in economic bondage—confined to the status of hewers of wood and drawers of water.

Here I think we are showing once more how much of Marxist theory is obsolete, divorced from mid-20th century reality. Marx claimed to have turned Professor Hegel on his head; now we have turned Marx on his head.

Adjustments in the advanced countries must, of course, proceed in an orderly manner and cannot be permitted to result in serious dislocations. There is need for a cushioning mechanism, perhaps through trade adjustment legislation; the advanced countries must find ways to share the burden of adjustment and to facilitate the shifting locus of production and trade patterns between themselves and the less advanced countries. Such a shift should be in the direction of enabling the advanced economies to concentrate production in sectors where they retain their greatest comparative advantage—which, incidentally, also happen to be the highest profit industries. Any adjustment and transition, of course, is always easier during periods of full employment.

We put much stress on this "burden sharing concept," for we feel that it makes as much sense to share the burden of economic assistance and the burden of resulting trade adjustments as it does, indeed, to share the benefits, political as well as economic, which will accrue to the entire free world if we are successful.

Gentlemen, in closing I feel I should return for a moment to a theme only touched upon earlier this evening, and this for the good reason that it deserves a speech in itself. Why is it that this decade of development will be, most certainly, a decade of decision?

I mentioned the telescoping of historic time, the quickening pace of human events. This is why the second industrial revolution must be pushed with such celerity and why the developing nations must be brought as rapidly as possible to plateaus of self-sustaining growth in the 1960's.

And if we have been dealing this evening with economic facts of life, it is economics with the strongest of political overtones. For history does not operate, and people do not live, in separate categories called now political, now economic.

We Americans have a special bond of fraternity with the many new statesmen in the new nations—we were once a "new nation" ourselves not too long ago. I have the feeling that some of these leaders of the political revolution in their own countries did not realize the complications that would remain. They have found the imperatives of economics to be as cruel as we know them to be. In the first days of the excitement of national freedom it is normal for many national leaders to feel that, once they have their hands on the levers of political

power in their own countries, somehow every forlorn valley can be made to bloom as a rose.

But it has not been roses all the way. Nor is it likely to be in the strenuous years ahead. Yet we do know that a process has been started that is irresistible, and these new statesmen can take heart that, with our sympathetic understanding and that of other economically advanced nations, the roads that lead to better tomorrows will yet be built.

President Comments on Status of Geneva Nuclear Test Ban Talks

Statement by President Kennedy¹

This week Ambassador Arthur H. Dean has reported to me upon the status of the nuclear test ban conference at Geneva. On the opening day of the resumed conference the United States in closest cooperation with the United Kingdom presented a series of new proposals, and on April 18, 1961, presented a complete nuclear test ban draft treaty. The new U.S. position represents an earnest and reasonable effort to reach a workable agreement and constitutes a most significant overall move in these negotiations. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has introduced a new proposition into the negotiations which amounts to a built-in veto of an inspection system.

The Soviet proposal calls for a three-man administrative council to direct inspection operations and other activities of the control arrangements. This proposal reverses a position to which the Soviet Union had previously agreed. In earlier negotiations before this session in Geneva² it had been agreed that the inspection system would be headed by a single administrator, operating within a mandate clearly defined in the treaty. The Soviet Union would substitute a directorate representing the Communist bloc, the Western nations, and uncommitted countries. Each member of this triumvirate would have to agree with every other member before any action could be taken; even relatively detailed elements of the inspection system would be subject to a veto or a debating delay.

We recognize that the Soviet Union put for-

¹ Made at a news conference on May 5.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1960, p. 482.

ward its proposition before it had considered our new proposals. It is now considering our draft treaty, and we hope it will do so in a positive manner as, of course, we are most anxious to secure an agreement in this vital area—a responsible and effective agreement.

Ambassador Dean is leaving for Geneva today to resume the negotiations. The United States will continue to strive for a reliable and workable agreement. I have asked Ambassador Dean to report to me within a reasonable time on the prospects for a constructive outcome.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 4

Press release 287 dated May 4

SECRETARY RUSK: Well, our agenda in the foreign policy field continues to be somewhat full. We are having a most interesting and useful visit with President Bourguiba and his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. [Sadok] Mokadem. We have had discussions this morning with both of them, and I followed it this afternoon with a short discussion with the Secretary of State, and we will continue those during their visit. They have received the warmest welcome here in Washington, and we feel that this visit has been extremely helpful in the relations between our two countries.

I will be leaving on Saturday morning for the annual spring meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers in Oslo. That meeting is, broadly speaking, a political meeting. That is, the ministers will talk about the general international situation and political problems within NATO itself, including more effective consultation and the cohesion of NATO. The North Atlantic Community is a source of great energy and strength in this present situation, and I think all of us who are members of it want to canvass every opportunity that we can find to strengthen it further. We do not expect to get into details of some of the defense questions which, most of you know, are before NATO for consideration. The permanent council—the North Atlantic Council—is discussing those and will be discussing them further, but the ministerial meeting which normally gets into the final stages of such questions takes place in the autumn or in the winter—December—when

the defense ministers as well as the foreign ministers are present.

I have just come back from a meeting of CENTO in Ankara¹ since I last met you here. I felt that that was a very useful meeting in reviewing the general situation with our friends in the Central Treaty Organization. We made a little headway with the "trade union of foreign ministers," seeking to create more tolerable working conditions. We decided to have formally scheduled meetings only once a year, subject to the possibility, of course, that if anything special comes up, we can have a special meeting of the ministers. But I think that it is probably true that in these treaty organizations we want to—all of us want to strengthen the Councils, that is, to strengthen the local representatives so that the most responsible and active discussion can go on among those who are permanently there, so that things don't come to a crescendo just when the foreign ministers meet.

Following the NATO meeting there is in prospect the 14-nation conference on Laos in Geneva, and I would suppose that I might be there at least for the opening of or a part of that.

On Laos itself, if you have been following your tickers right up to the point that you came here, you might be somewhat ahead of me at the moment on what is happening there. There is in prospect a cease-fire. It may take a day or two to clarify exactly the situation on that cease-fire. You have a considerable number of troops and

¹ See p. 778.

small units and detachments scattered over a very large part of the country. There may be communications difficulties on both sides, and there may be some irregularities which will have to be ironed out. We are hopeful that the cease-fire will in fact prove to come into being. There have been public pronouncements on both sides that indicate that that is their hope. We also, however, hope that political questions will not become enmeshed with the cease-fire on the ground, because it is hardly the circumstance under which to talk about political issues.

The next step presumably will be that the ICC [International Control Commission], with India as chairman, would move promptly into Laos to be in a position to report on the effectiveness of the cease-fire and that there would then be convened the 14-nation conference to talk about the international aspects of the Laotian problem.

The Laotians themselves, meanwhile, presumably will be discussing the possibilities of forming a Laotian government. Our general approach has been that the constitution of a government is not a matter which can be effectively dealt with through international negotiations or at a conference but that this is a matter to be worked out among the Laotians themselves. The leaders are in touch with each other, and we suppose that there will be a considerable amount of talk among them in the days and weeks ahead on that subject. But the entire situation is somewhat unpredictable, and the impressions which I might have at the moment could be changed by particulars which might come in in the next few hours or the next few days. It is something which is in flux and will have to be watched very closely.

I am very pleased to be able to announce that Senator [John J.] Sparkman of Alabama has agreed to represent the United States at the Regional Community Development Conference sponsored by the ICA [International Cooperation Administration] in Seoul from May 6 to May 12. Senator Sparkman will also stop over in Tokyo for discussions on matters of mutual interest with officials of the Japanese Government. It is particularly fortunate that Senator Sparkman will be able to represent the United States both in Tokyo and Seoul. He has long been a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as you know, and has been active in the formula-

tion of foreign policy for the United States. He has served on a number of our international delegations, including our delegation to the United Nations. His presence there will not only demonstrate the great interest that the new administration has in community development but will serve to establish useful contacts between us and the Governments of Korea and Japan.

Situation in Viet-Nam

I thought that it might be useful if I were to make some comments on the background of the situation in Viet-Nam—that is, not background comments but comments on the background.

Since late in 1959 organized Communist activity in the form of guerrilla raids against army and security units of the Government of Viet-Nam, terrorist acts against local officials and civilians, and other subversive activities in the Republic of Viet-Nam have increased to levels unprecedented since the Geneva agreements of 1954.² During this period the organized armed strength of the Viet Cong, the Communist apparatus operating in the Republic of Viet-Nam, has grown from about 3,000 to over 12,000 personnel. This armed strength has been supplemented by an increase in the numbers of political and propaganda agents in the area.

During 1960 alone, Communist armed units and terrorists assassinated or kidnaped over 3,000 local officials, military personnel, and civilians. Their activities took the form of armed attacks against isolated garrisons, attacks on newly established townships, ambushes on roads and canals, destruction of bridges, and well-planned sabotage against public works and communication lines. Because of Communist guerrilla activity 200 elementary schools had to be closed at various times, affecting over 25,000 students and 800 teachers.

This upsurge of Communist guerrilla activity apparently stemmed from a decision made in May 1959 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam which called for the reunification of Viet-Nam by all "appropriate means." In July of the same year the Central Committee was reorganized and charged with intelligence duties and the "liberation" of south Viet-Nam. In retrospect this decision to step up

²For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, Department of State publication 6446, p. 750.

guerrilla activity was made to reverse the remarkable success which the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam under President Ngo Dinh Diem had achieved in consolidating its political position and in attaining significant economic recovery in the 5 years between 1954 and 1959.

Remarkably coincidental with the renewed Communist activity in Laos, the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam at its Third Congress on September 10, 1960, adopted a resolution which declared that the Vietnamese revolution has as a major strategic task the liberation of the south from the "rule of U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." This resolution called for the direct overthrow of the government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The most recent gains by the Pathet Lao in the southern part of Laos have given added seriousness to the security situation in Viet-Nam. Communist control over Lao territory bordering Viet-Nam south of the 17th parallel makes more secure one of the three principal routes by which north Vietnamese armed units have been able to infiltrate the Republic of Viet-Nam. The other two routes are, as is well known, directly across the 17th parallel and by sea along the coastline of the Republic of Viet-Nam. In addition to the obvious fact that the strength of the Pathet Lao has been tremendously increased by the importation of light and heavy arms from the outside, we have no reason to doubt that the north Vietnamese armed units not operating in Laos have been similarly reequipped and strengthened from the same outside source.

The increased Communist activity in the Republic of Viet-Nam and countermeasures to meet this threat have been matters of urgent and recent discussion, both by the officials of Viet-Nam and the United States. In connection with these the President has authorized an increase in the amount of military assistance, and a number of other measures have been determined upon. Furthermore the United States has undertaken training and advisory measures which are designed to strengthen both materially and militarily the ability of the Viet-Nam armed forces to overcome this increased Communist threat. A part of the effort, of course, must include in a situation of this sort a vigorous civil program as well in the economic and social field. As you may recall, the members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-

tion expressed their concern about the situation in Viet-Nam in our recent conference in Bangkok,³ and it is perfectly apparent that we must all give very serious attention to developments in that country.

Now, I think I will be able to take a few questions.

Q. In your remarks on south Viet-Nam are you, in fact, suggesting that, as the war in Laos draws to a close, the Communists are simply opening up a new theater in southeast Asia?

A. I don't believe this is a shift from one theater to another. I think both of these countries have been under pressure from the Communists from the north, and the pressures in Laos have served to increase the pressures somewhat in Viet-Nam. The most active part of Communist efforts in Viet-Nam is occurring not in the north actually but in the south, the far south, in the Saigon area. But a considerable number of the personnel and also some of the supplies undoubtedly have been coming in from the north by infiltration—some of it through Laos.

Inter-American Consultations

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your opening remarks, you mentioned that you have just come back from a CENTO meeting and were on your way to a meeting of NATO. This brings to mind the itinerary of your predecessors and the frustration of many of your colleagues in Latin America. This criticism has gone on for many years—that we only consult about Latin American governments in times of grave crisis. I wonder if the administration does not consider the present developments in Latin America as critical and also if you could tell us why, at this time, for instance, we still don't have a United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States nor an Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

A. On the last point—both the Ambassador to the Organization of American States and the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs left their posts only recently—that is, early this month—and we have been working very hard to get their replacements. The search for talent is a continuous search, and it is not something which

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 17, 1961, p. 547.

happens overnight. We are working on that very hard at the present time.

On the matter of consulting with our inter-American friends, we are in very intense consultation with them at the present time about Cuba and other matters, about problems in the hemisphere arising from the penetration of the Sino-Soviet bloc into Cuba.

We expect to be moving shortly in the OAS to call a meeting of the IA-ECOSOC [Inter-American Economic and Social Council] to get into the Alliance for Progress program.⁴ We are not, in any sense, out of contact with our Latin American friends. I think that you must bear in mind that, in connection with any special meetings that might be called, particularly where there are highly complicated and difficult questions to come up, such meetings are useful only on the basis of a great deal of consultation ahead of time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech last night on foreign aid you said that too often in the past our aid has been governed less by the priority of a well-planned program than by the needs and pressures of the moment. There is a report from India that the United States Government is considering financing a nuclear power plant for India. Is that one of the projects that would contribute most to India's self-sustaining growth at this time?*

A. I would not want to get into that at the moment. The discussions of aid to India, both short-term and long-term, are going on at the present time. As you know, a consortium has recently met to get into that general question. Questions of [research] assistance [under] the atoms-for-peace program are somewhat separate from the broad question of economic development, and I would prefer not to comment specifically on the question right now.

The Laotian Question

Q. There seems to be a feeling of disappointment in the Philippines and in some other areas in southeast Asia because the United States and the SEATO powers did not intervene in Laos to stop the piecemeal advance of the Communists. They seem to fear that perhaps this indicates a

lack of will on our part to take military action, if necessary, in the event that the Communists turn their full attention on south Viet-Nam. What can you say in this regard?

A. These are questions which were thoroughly discussed at the SEATO Conference in Bangkok, and if you will go back and look at the communique or the resolutions which were issued from that Conference, you will see that that Conference agreed that an effort should be made to settle this Laotian question by negotiation, if possible. Failing that, the SEATO countries would be prepared to take appropriate measures.

Now, since early January we have been on that double track, in a sense, that is, the British and the Soviet Union, as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference of 1954, have been discussing between themselves the possibility of a cease-fire, followed by a convening of the ICC and a conference to take up that question.⁵

That is the track on which we are at the present time. I suppose that there would be differences in shading among governments, when a particular track runs out and when another track has to be adopted. But the present effort on the part of all those who are deeply involved in this is to settle this question without a major escalation of the fighting if possible.

Q. The charge has been made publicly that the south Vietnamese Government is both reactionary and corrupt and that one of the first priorities to shore that area up would be to encourage political reform. Would you care to comment on that?

A. I think that some of the remarks that I made last evening on foreign aid have some application; that is, questions of defense in a situation such as Viet-Nam cannot be dealt with solely in military terms. The quality of society, the interest of the people, the mobilization of the energies of the people, the satisfaction of the people in their own system, have a great deal to do with problems of security and the ability to withstand assault and attack and penetration and subversion from the outside.

I have no doubt that a broad program of civil action, improved administration, economic development in Viet-Nam ought to be continued and

⁴ See p. 766.

⁵ See p. 747.

⁵ For texts of the U.K.-U.S.S.R. proposals on Laos, see BULLETIN of May 15, 1961, p. 710.

expanded in order to help with the total situation there, and this is directly related to the defense problem.

Q. Do you think that corruption is the cause of the situation in south Viet-Nam?

A. I don't believe that corruption is the root cause of the situation there, in the face of amounts of determined activity by those coming in from the outside; that is, the initiative in the attack in south Viet-Nam is being taken by those who are attempting to overthrow that government and by those who would be trying to overthrow almost any government you could think of which is not under the control of north Viet-Nam. The economic and social programs and the development of the countryside are relevant to the response to this sort of attack.

Consultations on Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us anything about the assurance you gave the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Cuba?

A. The assurance I gave the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Cuba? We talked about a good many things in that meeting. I think the principal points that came up—are you now referring to—there were several, not all of which have been made public, and that was in executive session.

Q. The Senate Committee?

A. That is the one I am thinking about too. I did say that, as was reported, we were not contemplating armed attack on Cuba by United States forces. I also talked out with them problems of consultation on issues such as this, and I believe we reached some useful understanding on that point. Now, neither one of these may be the particular point you had in mind.

Q. Did you discuss the matter of a watchdog committee for CIA, which has been revived?

A. That is a matter in general discussion that would not be for me to talk to them about in detail, because this has broader jurisdictional problems that would not be my concern to deal with. Those questions are in the wind, as you know.⁷

Q. Mr. Dean⁸ has been back and made his report. Can you say when he will return to Geneva and what his instructions will be?

A. He has been back for some very useful talks. He was over with me at the White House today to give a report to the President. I think the President may wish to comment on that at the press conference tomorrow. I had better let that go until then.

Q. Have your consultations with the Latin American governments on Cuba produced any indication of what measures could be applied by a meeting and consultation? Specifically, is there any support for the idea of reestablishing the Committee for Political Defense?

A. There are two forums in which the general question of what happens next in the American hemisphere is being talked about. One of them is here in our own Government among the departments concerned, where we are studying very intensively the present situation, what suggestions we might wish to make, actions we might wish to take.

Second is consultation among the inter-American governments. This is, of course, a hemispheric problem as well as a Cuban problem and an American problem. We are discussing quite a range of possibilities with other governments and among ourselves. I think perhaps it would be premature for me to talk about a particular point such as the one you raised.

14-Nation Conference on Laos

Q. Mr. Secretary, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia has withdrawn his sponsorship of the 14-nation conference, and he has also quoted the King of Laos as being opposed to such a conference if there is a chance for the Laotians to work things out among themselves. Could you interpret this for us, and what does it mean as far as that conference is concerned? Would we go without the King's desire for us to do so?

A. Well, the formal position is that the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have, as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference in 1954, invited the 14 nations suggested by Prince Sihanouk to come to the conference in Geneva, now planned for the 12th.

⁷ For a White House announcement, see p. 773.

⁸ Arthur H. Dean, U.S. representative to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, which reconvened at Geneva Mar. 21. For a statement by President Kennedy, see p. 755.

It was anticipated that Prince Sihanouk would be there and might indeed open the conference, since the composition of the conference came about as a result of a suggestion which he had made. In a formal sense, therefore, Prince Sihanouk's announced attitude on it would not affect the status of the conference. Whether in fact he will persist in his present view is something that we just don't know. And I think we are not at all sure of just what lay behind the statement he made about withdrawing his sponsorship and reconsidering whether he would send a delegation. I think perhaps the King's remark was related more to the question of the composition of a government.

There are some questions which the Laotians ought to work out for themselves, and the composition of government is probably one of those. But there are others which can only be handled really internationally; that is, any effort made to establish internationally the neutral status of a country, or to work out relationships with blocs or countries in terms of inspections or arms supply, or things of that sort, would have to be handled internationally.

I would not, I think, today, be able to give you a full appreciation, as the British call it, of just what Prince Sihanouk's recent statement amounts to.

Q. To go back to the first question as to whether this cease-fire in Laos is now going to open up a new theater, granted the fact that this infiltration has been going on in Viet-Nam, is it your view that in fact peace in Laos is going to mean a stepped-up Communist effort against not only Viet-Nam but perhaps Thailand and Cambodia?

A. Well, this in effect means to predict what is in the minds of the people to the north. We have no reason to think that these pressures will be relaxed. We believe that the infiltration or efforts at infiltration will continue. That has been the case in Viet-Nam for some time. It has been the case in Laos. We think that this area has to be better organized and better supported in an effort to stop the pressure from the north.

Q. In that connection, this statement is very strong about the peril to Viet-Nam. Would we assume that, if the Diem government asked for direct armed intervention by American troops, this would happen?

A. Well, this is a question for the future that I wouldn't wish to answer categorically today. But there will be a very strong effort made now to reinforce that situation there and give them every possible help, across the entire spectrum in which help is needed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, could you give us some idea of the dimensions of this increased aid and also whether the training and advisers that you mentioned involve the sending of American advisers down to the tactical level, as we did in Laos?

A. I think perhaps the details of that are something that I should leave aside for the moment, if you don't mind. We may have certain things on that that we can announce later. But for the moment we had better leave them where they are.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that the formation of a government for the time being, at least, is a matter for the Laotians to work out. Would we accept a Communist-dominated government if this was something the Laotians worked out? And if we did, what happened to our idea of keeping Laos independent and neutral?

A. Well, that is of course one of the central problems in the process of negotiation or in any conference that comes up. I think perhaps I commented on it one or two press conferences ago, as to why we feel that the constitution of a government is not a matter which can be easily dealt with at an international conference.

Building a government means putting people together in a particular cabinet and administration, and that inevitably involves change from time to time. International agreements saying this should be the government of this country almost by definition can't stand up very long, because cabinets do change and personnel turns over. So that we feel, quite apart from that factor, this is something that the Laotians themselves need to talk over.

As a matter of fact, you will recall that we have been in touch ourselves with the King and the present government for weeks and months, raising with them, or suggesting to them, the possibility of reviewing every opportunity to broaden the base of the government. This is one of the elements in the situation which could make some difference in this present problem.

Reactions to Events in Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a broad question on Cuba which hasn't been asked: This country has been attacked abroad over the Cuban operation as inept, fumbling, clumsy, bumbling, et cetera. Can you say in any broad way what kind of steps are contemplated to correct this image abroad?

A. Well, there has been a great variety in the image abroad. I think in Latin America there has been a considerable crystallization of concern and anxiety about the penetration of this hemisphere—by now, in his own terms, a declared member of the Sino-Soviet bloc. This was a question which has been discussed and talked about in the hemisphere, but I think the recent episode has underlined this question as an urgent question.

Abroad, you get a variety of reaction to the situation. And there are many who are concerned about what seems to them to be a further extension of the Sino-Soviet influence. There are those who are concerned because they realize that this cannot help but have an impact upon American opinion and American attitudes toward problems in other parts of the world.

I don't think it would be possible to generalize the reaction on it. But the thing to do now, it seems to me—in the face of this setback which this group suffered there, and which we suffered—the thing to do now is to draw a deep breath and look over the situation very carefully and consider a wide range of problems involved and possible actions which ought to be taken; and, most of all, to stay on the main road of hemispheric development and hemispheric solidarity. That is the object of the exercise at present. And, of course, that will be somewhat complicated by the special issues involved in the Cuban question. But a great deal of the Cuban question arises because it is a hemispheric question and the hemisphere is the great concern. And we must turn our attention to the unity and solidarity and strengthening of the hemisphere. And that involves a lot of things—some small, some large.

Q. Mr. Secretary, not long ago Senator [Mike] Mansfield in an article stressed the importance of alert and sensitive leadership in inter-American affairs. He said: "Unless it is present, there is danger that we shall interpret the Latin American situation primarily in terms of Castroism and communism. If we do so, the basic problem will

elude us. To be sure, Castroism and communism are powerful forces, but they are in the nature of an effect rather than a cause." In the light of recent events, sir, would you share this opinion of Senator Mansfield?

A. I think Senator Mansfield is on the right and broad track there. One of the problems about the shape of events in Cuba is that they took over from an earlier situation in Cuba which invited revolution in that country. And we all acknowledge, of course, that in the early days of the Castro revolution, when it was looked upon as an economic and social revolution against intolerable conditions and represented a broad appeal of the peoples for improvement in the situation, it had great sympathy all over the hemisphere and in this country.

Now the revolutionary movement, based upon the revolution of rising expectations, based upon an attempt to reduce the gap between the privileged and the nonprivileged—these are real factors which ought not be confused with the penetration of this hemisphere by the Sino-Soviet bloc. They are factors which open the way for such penetration. But unless they are dealt with, and unless we work at them along the Alliance for Progress and along the other means that are there for our disposal, then the hemisphere is weakened.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much thought has been given to the possibility that Senator Johnson's visit to Saigon^{} might be another Caracas?*

A. You mean the Vice President's visit?

Q. Yes, the Vice President's visit.

A. Well, the Vice President has in mind a visit to several countries out in that part of the world. We think that it would be a very useful thing if it can be worked out. I would not myself think that it would create problems of the sort you mentioned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in order to insure the neutrality of Laos, or to remove it from the cold war, would it perhaps be useful to examine whether the leading neutralist countries in the area—India and Burma, say—would undertake to guarantee this neutrality?

A. Well, the attitude of the neutral countries in the area on a problem of this sort is, of course, very

^{*} See p. 750.

important. And this is something that is being discussed with them. Because the capacity of Laos to be internationally neutral, that is, "unaligned," as the SEATO resolution put it, is something of great interest to all of those countries out there, whether they are neutral or linked to the free world. Whether they would get into the question of guarantees, I think, is highly speculative at this point.

What Is Peripheral?

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been criticism, or suggestion at least, from a prominent commentator that the United States should not risk becoming bogged down in peripheral war such as in the jungles of southeast Asia. Does your statement, pointing out the perils in south Viet-Nam, and other statements by this administration, and the action at SEATO mean that the United States will risk becoming involved in such peripheral wars and will make its commitments valid?

A. Well, I wouldn't wish to comment on that question in terms of any particular statement which might have been made about it to which you might have referred. But, in broad terms, this can, I think, be dealt with as a generality, as to what is peripheral and what is central. Because if you don't pay attention to the periphery, the periphery changes. And the first thing you know the periphery is the center. I mean, peace and security are worldwide. That is particularly true these days, when the doctrine of a historically inevitable world revolution, backed by action, is in confrontation with the free world right around the globe. And what happens in one place cannot help but affect what happens in another.

But, on the other hand, in what I suppose has been referred to as the periphery—that is, in these vast newly independent, underdeveloped parts of the world—there is a great deal that can be done by preventive action to strengthen them against the kinds of attacks to which they are most likely to be subject in the immediate future.

So there is a building job to be done. I am hopeful that that will not involve military necessity. But let's not, I think, generalize too quickly about the periphery being relatively unimportant compared to the center. That, I think, can lead us down a long track.

Alliance for Progress vs. Communism

*Remarks by Adolf A. Berle
Chairman, Task Force on Latin America¹*

Latin America is now an area of conflict in the cold war. That was settled in 1959 at a Communist Party conference in Moscow shortly after Fidel Castro had betrayed an honest, democratic Cuban revolution and delivered his country and his colleagues into the hands of the overseas Communist bloc.

Castro's action, and the armed organization which followed it, deprived Cuba and the Cuban people of the self-determination for which thousands of Cuban revolutionaries had sacrificed their lives. Cubans do not accept this betrayal. Despite the tragic defeat of a few days ago, the contest will continue until Cuba is once more free.

Actually the struggle in Cuba is only part of the cold war for all Latin America. Freedom will win. It is true that freedom must meet the combined resources of the now powerful Communist empires, but it is as certain to win as was Bolívar when he fought the whole might of the Spanish Empire.

All of us today owe support and gratitude to President Kennedy for his brilliant and honest speech,² making it clear that this was also the cause of the United States. He forthrightly answered Khrushchev's challenge. He made it clear that the United States would meet its primary obligations of national and hemispheric defense against outside Communist penetration. By implication he made clear that foreign intervention does not cease to be foreign intervention because it flies a domestic flag and claims to be social revolution.

Yet in the heroic drama of the past 10 days, sight must not be lost of the great and historic issue: whether Latin America shall grow and flourish in freedom or as a province of overseas Communist empires. This depends in part on us.

It is no accident that no Communist movement of importance exists in the United States. The reason is that the United States has freedom and

¹ Made before the Woman's National Democratic Club at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 24 (press release 253).

² BULLETIN of May 8, 1961, p. 659.

maintains freedom for each and all within its borders. Its economic development goes on in social doctrine which assures to everyone a share in economic success. This is not due to American materialism. It comes from the spiritual quality of the United States. Believing in many religions, Americans unite in accepting the obligation common to all of them. Under that obligation all have responsibility for their brothers and for their neighbors. All of them—Christians, Jews, agnostics—recognize the common duty of brotherhood, in material things as well as in the world of ideas. They accept that duty. This is the beating heart of the greatest revolution of them all—the revolution of progress and freedom in brotherhood and mutual help, making each one capable and leaving each one free to seek eternal values of duty and truth.

Like development is the road to independence and progress in Latin America. This is the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress. That was what President Kennedy was saying on March 13 last.²

Because the United States is better defended, better prepared, and better equipped to help, we can make a powerful contribution to this, the revolution of progress and freedom in the American hemisphere. We can say—because we have proved it—that social needs for the masses are just as important as economic development. We can say, because we have demonstrated it, that economic development is not for the purpose of making the rich richer but of lifting the poor out of poverty and the illiterate out of ignorance.

There is a close parallel between the situation today and the situation as it stood in 1947. Then the Communist bloc was seeking to take over Greece under the camouflage of revolution. The United States moved in to support Greek independence. The Communist forces denounced the Marshall plan as the overseas Communists in Castro's name now denounce the Alliance for Progress. Then the Communist bloc planned to upset every government in Western Europe as today they threaten Latin American governments. I am clear that Latin Americans debating the question will choose the Alliance for Progress in the face of the threats and false promises of overseas Communist-paid agents and propagandists.

All the evidence I have of current reaction indi-

cates the Latin American peoples are making their choice. Outside Cuba and the Dominican Republic, Latin Americans are free to express their views. They have expressed them vigorously in the past few days. Their opinion, expressed in the press, by their governments, by student groups, by political parties, is overwhelmingly for an Alliance for Progress and against extension of the Communist system in Latin America.

I say again, we owe this very largely to the swift and statesmanlike action of President Kennedy. History will, I think, rank this stand of his with President Truman's determination to repel the attack on Korea and with the courage and determination of Winston Churchill which overcame the Nazi threat.

The American public and the American Congress owe him all support.

Ambassador Moscoso's Experience Seen Helpful to U.S.-Venezuelan Relations

Statement by President Kennedy

White House press release dated May 2

I have today [May 2] met with Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, whom it has been my pleasure to name to the very important post of Ambassador to Venezuela.¹ I expect him to depart for his new post within the next few days.

Ambassador Moscoso has a brilliant record as Administrator of the Economic Development Administration of Puerto Rico in carrying out what has come to be known throughout the world as Operation Bootstrap, that dramatic effort through which economic diversification and development have brought a high degree of social benefits and equitable shares of economic returns to our fellow citizens in that island.² I believe that Ambassador Moscoso's experience in this field will enhance his ability to treat sympathetically and knowingly with the Government and people of Venezuela and to insure maximum effectiveness for the common

¹ Ambassador Moscoso's appointment was confirmed by the Senate on Apr. 18; for biographic details, see Department of State press release 263 dated Apr. 27.

² For a statement made by Ambassador Moscoso before the Committee for Industrial Development of the U.N. Economic and Social Council at New York, N.Y., on Mar. 29, see BULLETIN of Apr. 24, 1961, p. 605.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

efforts to provide a better life for the people of Venezuela and the entire Western Hemisphere.

I am confident that Ambassador Moscoso will be warmly welcomed among our friends in Venezuela as my personal envoy and as a particularly appropriate representative of the people of the entire United States.

U.S. Denies Validity of Alleged "Instruction" Regarding Cuba

Following is the text of a note from Philip W. Bonsal, U.S. Interim Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, addressed to José A. Mora, OAS Secretary General.

No. 714

APRIL 18, 1961

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the "*Acta de la Sesión Ordinaria Celebrada el 4 de Enero de 1961*", pages 56-58 (OEA/Ser.G/II, C-a-397).

On January 4, 1961 the alternate delegate of the Government of Cuba read to the Council of the Organization of American States a paper purporting to contain instructions of 1897 or 1898 addressed by the Government of the United States to General Nelson A. Miles, who commanded the United States forces in the liberation of Cuba. According to this alleged paper, General Miles was ordered to pursue a divisive policy in Cuba to prepare the way for its annexation by the United States, which would then use the island as an outlet for Negro emigration.

I am certain that none of the members of the Council was misled by the employment of the so-called "instruction" alleged to have been issued over half a century ago as part of the propagandistic attacks from the present Cuban Government to which the Council has been subjected from time to time in recent months. Nevertheless, in order that there might be no doubt in the minds of those who might come upon this canard in the records of this important inter-American forum, my Government initiated a thorough and careful re-study of the matter. As a result, I can now report that the story as told by the alternate Cuban delegate is only a new version of a legend long discredited.

The United States first learned of the alleged instructions in 1908, when they were printed in

the Cuban newspaper *El Eco de Holguín*. The Department of State promptly called the matter to the attention of the War Department, and on November 23, 1908 the Assistant Secretary of War (whose office was supposed to have drafted the memorandum) replied that there was no record of the document in his office and that in his opinion "the alleged communication has no official authenticity."

Since 1908, the alleged instructions have been quoted numerous times. They were later attributed to J. C. Breckinridge—presumably General Breckinridge, Inspector General of the United States Army. (Such instructions, even if genuine, would certainly not have been issued by the Inspector General.) Among others, Horatio S. Rubens, in his book *Liberty: The Story of Cuba* (New York, 1932), pages 343-345, and Herminio Portell Vilá in *Historia de Cuba en sus Relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España* (La Habana, 1939), Volume III, pages 460-461, referred to these instructions which were erroneously considered by them to be authentic.

Twenty-seven years ago, in the *American Historical Review* for April 1934, Colonel Thomas M. Spaulding, a military historian, wrote a short unofficial paper on the subject entitled "Propaganda or Legend". He discussed the alleged memorandum and pointed out numerous discrepancies between it and genuine documents of the War Department. In Colonel Spaulding's judgment the so-called Breckinridge memorandum was a fabricated document actually written—possibly first in Spanish rather than English—at some time between 1900 and 1906 by someone unfamiliar with War Department practice.

As this alleged paper has been revived through the years, the records have been carefully searched several more times to see if any basis whatsoever could be found for the story. No such basis has been found.

Most recently, in a letter to the Department of State, dated March 13, 1961, the National Archives reported that an examination of the records in its custody had failed to disclose a copy of this document or anything resembling it and that its examination had confirmed the results of previous searches, all of which were negative and which tended to confirm the conclusion that the document is spurious.

Thus, no evidence has yet been found to show that the alleged memorandum is genuine. Both

in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States, the Government of Cuba has repeatedly attacked the United States without any regard for historical accuracy and truth; it has deliberately distorted and twisted the facts of U.S.-Cuban relations, from the period of Cuban independence to the present, to try and substantiate its numerous false charges against my Government and its people. To quote from this alleged memorandum can only be regarded as another example of the present Cuban Government's bitter campaign against the United States.

I would appreciate it if you would transmit this note to the representatives on the Council for their information.¹

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

PHILIP W. BONSAI

Interim Representative of the United States on the Council of the Organization of American States.

His Excellency

DR. JOSÉ A. MORA,
*Secretary General,
Organization of American States.*

President Calls for IA-ECOSOC Talks To Plan Development in Americas

Statement by President Kennedy²

I have today [May 5] instructed the United States representatives on the Council of the Organization of American States to propose the convocation on July 15 of an extraordinary meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to be held at the ministerial level. The purposes of this meeting should be to initiate and develop planning and arrangements related to realistic economic development in the Americas, as well as to elaborate the objectives of the Act of Bogotá and all key areas of economic and social betterment. This will be an important aspect of the cooperative program which I have set forth in the concept of the Alliance for Progress.³

¹ Circulated as OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/VI, C/INF-874 on Apr. 20.

² Made at a news conference on May 5.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.

President Expresses U.S. Willingness To Aid Central African Republic

Following is an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and David Dacko, President of the Central African Republic.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO PRESIDENT DACKO

White House press release dated May 4

MAY 4, 1961

His Excellency DAVID DACKO

President

Central African Republic

Bangui, Central African Republic

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I appreciated your letter on your desire to make plans for the economic and social development of your country. The United States, as you know, has always made clear its wish to assist the newly independent African countries to establish strong and stable economies, to the extent that our heavy commitments permit us to contribute to this goal. I can, therefore, assure you of my country's desire to be of assistance.

In the immediate future, if you wish, I am prepared to send to your country representatives from the United States International Cooperation Administration to discuss with you and your government ways in which the United States can best respond to your request.

In the meantime, may I suggest you and other appropriate officials of your government make available to our Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. [Alan W.] Lukens, more details of your thinking on an economic program for the Central African Republic. I shall read his reports and recommendations with great interest.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

PRESIDENT DACKO TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Official translation

EXCELLENCY:

Formulation of a pilot plan for the development of the Central African Republic

I have the honor to inform you of my desire to have a comprehensive study conducted on the subject of the development of Central African Republic for the purpose of outlining the economic and social course my Government will have to take.

The European Economic Community has offered to grant me the necessary funds to carry out this study, and I have decided to enter into an agreement with that organization with a view to financing the study from the resources of the European Development Fund.

I have also asked the French Government for financial and technical assistance, to be furnished by the Assistance and Cooperation Fund.

I should like to know under what conditions it would be possible for me to obtain technical assistance from the American Government for the establishment and implementation of this plan, whether it be a question of studies requiring highly qualified experts, or of concrete operations decided upon in application of the Plan.

Under an agreement concluded on November 21, 1960, I have called on the Société pour le Développement de l'Afrique Equatoriale [Society for the Development of Equatorial Africa], to coordinate, under the direction of my ministerial departments, all operations designed to lead to the establishment and implementation of the plan for economic and social development.

In view of the importance I attach to the prompt formulation of objectives of long-term development, I should be most happy if my request could be accorded favorable consideration as soon as possible.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my high consideration.

D. DACKO

Africa—Hopes and Contradictions

by Eleanor Lansing Dulles

*Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research*¹

The change that is sweeping through Africa is bound to stimulate the minds of men everywhere as it presents them with new problems. The continent which may change the course of the United Nations and affect all our lives sooner or later is only lightly touched here and there by Western philosophy and civilization. The organization, mechanization, and educational resources which are the solid rocks on which our material and intellectual life is founded are little understood here.

It is important to recognize the variety and in some cases the contradictions. If we do not, we may attempt to apply policies inappropriate to special situations. We may fail to furnish the help which will be most effective. Such mistakes can be avoided.

It is easy to understand that on this vast land mass 220 million people look up to see the not infrequent airplane flying over forest and desert and find it as mysterious as if produced by some alien magic. It is hardly more a source of wonder, however, than are the simple tools of house-

hold and workshop to which they are now only gradually becoming accustomed. The wheel, the pump, the plow, have become known—even the bicycle and the automobile are familiar in the cities and the coastal areas. In the bush, however, women are beasts of burden, the earth is crudely scratched with wood or metal, and the dwellings are thatched mud huts. There are few roads, ports, railroads, telephones, or other means of communication. In many places the people do not even want the confusing, custom-shattering development for which a few are passionately clamoring.

The contrasts from north to south are many and startling. They take the visual form of spectacular rivers, mountains, and deserts. They make a personal impact in the climate of steaming jungles and high cool uplands. They are evident in the easy life of tropical coast and islands not far from bustling cities with skyscrapers and seaports and airfields. It is possible to find many and various types of living among hunters and nomads, miners and traders.

Here there are, mainly on the seacoasts, ancient civilizations, such as those on the Mediterranean, and some of the most primitive tribes, as the "Harmless People" of the Kalahari Desert.

¹Address made before a meeting sponsored by the 100,000 Club and The Association of University Women at Utica, N.Y., on Apr. 28 (press release 261 dated Apr. 28).

I was not able to visit all of these areas, but in my recent travels to 24 countries during a trip of almost 100 days I saw what was typical on the continent.

Variety and Contrast

The north—I stopped in Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, Egypt, and also the Sudan, which looks both north and south. Then I went on for several days in Ethiopia with its centuries-old dynasty, its ancient branch of the Christian church, its feudal society, its impressive Emperor. This country stands somewhat by itself in politics and tradition.

East Africa, with promise of freedom and menace of race antagonism, is now on the exciting verge of independence. In planning for freedom, the dozen or more political leaders in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam have reached a degree of statesmanship that shines in sharp contrast to the tribal leaders of the separate units who still wander in the uplands and the bush with their cattle, not far from the roving herds of zebras, elephants, and giraffes that make this part of Africa so attractive to tourists. Here the "white settlers" with gracious farms, brilliant with blue jacaranda and red flame trees, have planted and cultivate a civilization that compounds the problems of Black Africa. Few can see how there can be a reconciliation of the land problem affecting the few whites and the many Africans and other differences, without conflict at the worst and only with brilliant political management at the best.

Zanzibar is politically a part of the East African problem and is joined with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika in an effective economic partnership which amounts for most purposes to a common market. It lies like a pearl shining in bright water with waving palm trees and shores washed by the warm sea of the Indian Ocean. Here the past seems to have made an imprint in every narrow walled street behind every massive carved door. In fact, the past has left little room for the future which may shatter with political conflict the dreamlike quality of the island.

The Portuguese territories are the most disturbing and contradictory of all. Cities like Lourenço Marques and Luanda show the face of civilization above the native markets and the teeming waterfront. A short way inland the cement houses and paved roads disappear and only narrow

tracks and mud huts with scattered primitive native culture and activity are to be seen. Here problems of enforcing law and order have brought both the skills and some of the less desirable methods of control to primitive lands vast in extent, capable of limited development, but lacking in rich or easily exploited resources.

West Africa breaks down into many segments. Even the former Belgian, the former French, and former British colonies have little unity. Only the French have managed to lay the groundwork for a promising federation. With the exception of Guinea, pursuing a bitterly determined course of its own, of Mali and of Togo, waiting and watching the other French-speaking territories, the other 12, including Madagascar, are working together with constructive plans in considerable harmony. These countries form two crescents geographically reaching from the coast to the edges of the Sahara. Madagascar lies off the east coast of the continent.

In this group of countries statesmen who have won not only education but experience in France are endeavoring to consolidate a workable federation—with monetary union, with coordination of trade and customs duties, budgets, and transport over an area almost as extensive as the United States. There is hope that they may develop with harmonious action a viable and progressive economy in the next decade. If they can keep tribal conflicts to a minimum and receive substantial aid from the United States and from elsewhere in the free world, these friendly and still undeveloped countries may achieve a working relation which can serve as a model and a forerunner for those who have not yet a clear concept of the value of cooperation.

The former French territories can attempt to achieve a useful association now that colonialism is ended. Nigeria, a more compact country but with a larger population, is already a federation. It is important that these diverse elements of north, east, and west be held together—that they be aided and guided by all those who are acceptable to their leadership. This may not be easy because of the diversity of religion and custom, but it is considered probable by most experienced observers. If northern Nigeria is tempted to go a separate way, its communications with port cities would become extremely difficult.

The extent and varied resources of Nigeria, particularly its well-trained civil servants, have led to considerable optimism as to its economic future. Even its federal differences and the existence of a political opposition give a vitality and a resilience not found in most of the new countries.

One could almost summarize the west coast of Africa by saying that the differences are greater than the similarities. Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Senegal, and the others all share several characteristics. These include high illiteracy, lack of industry, few trained people, and the general aspects of poverty, lack of roads, transport, housing, consumer goods, and no informative press. They differ widely in political attitudes, relations to other countries, products, resources, and economic needs.

It is important to review these and other contrasts more generally since the danger of developing a generalized policy or overall solutions might lead to false expectations and grave disappointment.

Political Contradictions

It is difficult to give a true picture of the mood and the will of the people of Africa. Most of our information has been gained from the handful of leaders who come to the United Nations or talk with visiting officials in the capitals. More than 200 million have no effective means of expression—few of us know or can even guess what the simple tribesman thinks about political matters. For the most part he wants only a respite from certain types of hardship; perhaps he craves a few material signs of personal good standing in his group, some more cattle to enhance his status, or other more mysterious and primitive symbols.

Because of the limits to our exposure to the African in remote places and his inability to communicate with us in an effective way, we have developed in many cases an idea of the demand for independence not found among the 200 millions living in the more remote areas and different even from the ideas of the chiefs. They want better times, a mystical symbolic kind of freedom. They hate colonialism, but they do not understand the nature of national government. As one group said to its leader, "We want independence but we do not want responsibility."

We understand, at least in part, what the leaders

of Africa think will come once colonialism has disappeared. We do not always know what those in the villages, forests, and deserts expect of the new world that this new freedom could bring. A variety of psychological and political factors must be taken into account in selecting our priorities. We need to bring great wisdom to our planning. In any case we know that there has been considerable impatience and disappointment with developments so far. In some cases, in the Congo and in several other countries, independence has brought political uncertainty and new economic problems. This was for the most part not anticipated. In a number of countries the flash of lightning that came with the end of colonialism was followed by storms of internal conflict and economic hardship.

Another anomaly in the situation is that although independence, often newly won, is designed to free the people from colonial indignities and restrictions, in many cases centralized government and one-party systems have taken the place of colonial commissions. These are the types of governments most likely to bring rigorous dictatorial controls unless there are well-devised offsetting factors. While they do not wish to trade old types of controls for new, there are cases where this is a real danger. Many find this situation hard to understand.

Closely related to these surprises and disappointments are the questions raised by the new leadership in Africa. It is amazing that a score or two of African leaders whose names were hardly known 2 years ago are now clear images in the world of international relations. These shrewd, often well-educated and experienced leaders have made an impact on world affairs. Some of the realities which lie behind their achievements, however, paint a different picture and reveal a degree of local weakness which explains cases of arbitrary action and is one element which makes promises of aid from Communist quarters seem especially attractive.

It is important that we understand these contradictions and contrasts. Their desire for freedom does not follow the lines we expect. What they have hoped for in the way of progress has been frustrated and led to cynicism in many cases. They have allowed the aspects of their personal freedom to be compromised. Their leaders, often

able and even impressive, stand on uncertain ground. Some of the mistakes past and future result from these conditions. Some of the hopes for constructive action depend on this understanding.

Economic Contrasts and Paradoxes

There are in this vast continent enormous differences in minerals, water resources, agricultural conditions, and degrees of human initiative. In much of Africa the lakes and rivers give the possibility of rich cultivation and almost unlimited hydroelectric power. Elsewhere sweeping sands and dry savannas necessitate at the present time a wandering, unstable existence. These sharp contrasts are representative of the wide variety of conditions.

The seacoast gives many areas easy access to the outside world. It affects their stage of development and their future potential. Other countries, landlocked and almost inaccessible by road or river, retain their isolated and unchanging way of life. These move more slowly down the corridors of time.

When one considers the extent of the continent, its changing topography, and the extremes of climate, the variation in economic production and commerce is not surprising.

It would not be possible to apply to Africa a single uniform aid program or economic policy. In some cases agriculture will continue to be the main source of livelihood. In many countries better distribution of water, methods of cultivation, and crop diversification are crucial to development and progress. In some, industrialization and the development of power and transport are essential. In others the extraction of minerals and the development of related production enterprises hold great promise.

There is as much variation between the present means of livelihood and future potential as there is in Latin America and Asia. The differences are as great as in the United States if one leaves aside the major urban centers in America.

Recognition of these facts is essential to the formulation of aid programs, commercial policy, and the ability to plan for development. When they are compounded by the different degrees of education and the extent to which leadership affects policy in some countries, the need for a near look at each case is apparent.

The keen trading ability of the Arabs, the Hausa tribe, and the Mammy traders in West Africa is in sharp contrast to the casual and almost indifferent attitude toward money or material possessions. In Madagascar, for instance, there are said to be only one or two businessmen out of a population of Malagasy of 5 million. Most of the work is undertaken by Chinese or other minority groups.

The differences cited point to a possible emphasis in developing aid programs. Since it is recognized that the requirements for widespread and rapid development exceed both hopes and expectations, selection must be made between various targets and areas to which aid is directed. In making this selection attention needs to be paid to the characteristics relevant to the potential for development. In particular, account must be taken of natural resources, supporting elements in transportation and communication, and human skills and attitudes. It is not possible for the United States, or for any other country for that matter, to bring to Africa all the skills and resources needed to lift it from its present stage of development to new levels of accomplishment. Many of the local resources, however limited, will have to be improved and combined to contribute substantially to the total program.

In the current phase of our effort in Africa, which is in its first beginnings, we can, and in fact should, seek out, as indicated in a number of pronouncements by the administration, those centers of ferment and initiative which can release the energy and stimulate the ideas needed for the next step forward.

Paper plans and local governmental programs are important, but along with them must come a realization of the inherent ability, the technical skill, and the will to work of many thousands. Generally speaking, the attitudes and capacities which are needed are found at those points where transportation and communication have already brought the contacts and the dynamic interchange of ideas which have not only influenced officials and top businessmen but also workers and traders who operate on a small scale. These elements of progress do not exist only in capital cities or in seaports but are also found in a few other centers where trade routes have crossed for centuries and where rich mineral or other resources have brought an activity which has shaken loose the communities from feudal and tribal restrictions.

It is possible clearly in a number of instances to go into many of the underdeveloped and remote areas and establish such new centers with outside aid and cooperation of the new leaders. There are perhaps ten or a dozen cases which are ripe for consideration and may merit large-scale effort. If these centers are added to those which now exist, it will be found that there are in Africa some 30 or 40 points each of which can be made a focus for a special endeavor and from which can radiate by virtue of local effort and initiative dynamic and yet well-sustained influences which will be the lifeblood of progress. In these centers, either existing or to be created, education, training, and certain model activities should be set up. These models should not be shaped by the unattainable standards of an elaborate civilization but should be designed to bridge a gap between some of the more modern structures and undertakings in the few larger cities and the temporary and primitive shelters and production efforts to be found in many of the more remote areas.

The approach here outlined would call for progress moving out from central points in concentric circles. The reason for this type of planning where it proves feasible would be the possibility of achieving balanced development and, in the early stages of change, of not moving too rapidly or acting in a drastic manner to break up familiar patterns of behavior in cases where these cannot be brought within an orderly pattern of economic interchange and governmental control.

It is, of course, not possible to set limits to the influences which are causing political turbulence and economic unrest in a number of places. It is possible, however, to concentrate on certain existing points of economic and political advancement in a few places where there are clear evidences of underdeveloped riches which should not be neglected even in the first stages of development. It is because of the need to recognize the wide differences between capacities and resources, and because even the primitive ways of life give a temporary and partial stability which the more highly developed towns and cities cannot easily bring, that attention to this type of approach seems to be warranted.

We in America have launched ourselves on a very difficult task. It is one which cannot be accomplished without close cooperation and deep understanding on the part of the Africans. They have so far moved slowly from central points to

outlying areas. It would be unfortunate if the wiping away of colonialism would be allowed to upset the balance and unleash forces which cannot be controlled. In making decisions on matters affecting the location, the nature, and the pace of development, the Africans must be our guides. They, becoming aware of the connections between the various aspects of their economic and social conditions and their recognition of the limits which we know affect our capacity to bring them aid, will be an important element in their guidance of our plans.

Educational Extremes

It is well known that illiteracy in Africa is almost complete in the interior regions far from coastal cities or the few highly developed capitals and industrial centers. Reading and writing have not been a part of tribal life. What is not so well known is that there are in Africa a number of highly developed universities in the former Belgian Congo, in Uganda, in Nigeria, in Dakar, and a number of other places. It is also not always realized that those leaders who have emerged into prominence have in many cases the benefit of the best English, French, and American education. Now there are thousands of students studying behind the Iron Curtain and more thousands in Europe, in the United States, and elsewhere.

The disparity between the highly educated and those who have had little opportunity to gain the rudiments of education is likely to increase. It can cause serious unrest and increase instability. There is an enormous thirst for learning. It is an almost mystical urge expressed to all visitors to this changing, often puzzling area.

Unless a larger percentage of the students can turn to teaching and unless schools can be built and organized, the effects of higher education will not be diffused throughout the areas needing to move one step forward in the use of the tools of the mind. This gap between the excellence of the university to which some students go and the prevalence of ignorance and superstition in which 200 million live is a circumstance affecting our aid and our political relations directly and indirectly. Democracy implies some degree of literacy. Representative government is impossible without communication and understanding.

There will be a high degree of uncertainty in all our dealings in Africa in these early stages of de-

velopment because of the lack of education and training. Unusual patience will be needed in the interim period. Above all, efforts should be made to plan not only to help educate those who can come to the main centers of learning but to consider the relative needs at different levels and in different places.

The Moment for Action

The political, economic, and educational differences to be found in Africa have been briefly touched on.

Other contrasts in point of view, attitudes toward the outside world, and aspirations for the future are evident in the several religions, in the stages of development, in the varying exposure to European and American culture, and in the affinities which are apparent in dealing with various countries. These diverse conditions in themselves give an opportunity for action.

The conclusion that a traveler or student reaches is that now is the time when we must show our ability not only to understand and to be friendly but to do something. For us who see this diversity and know the changing times this is not a Dark Continent of the 19th century but one brilliant with color and motion. It is a continent which will develop new cultures and unexplored riches. Its forests and uplands will gradually yield to the moderating influences of civilization. Its people will be creative in ways which have become somewhat repressed or forgotten in the West. We may not always understand the rhythm of these lands, but we can even now hear the drumbeat and know it sounds a varied and changing message to which we must listen.

United States and Morocco Sign Food-for-Peace Agreement

White House press release dated May 4

President John F. Kennedy announced on May 4 that the United States has entered into a major food-for-peace agreement with the Government of Morocco. The \$17.8 million work-project agreement is the largest of its type ever to be undertaken by the U.S. Food-for-Peace Program.

The President has authorized his Food-for-Peace Director, George McGovern, to proceed with

the program, which will utilize 200,000 tons of U.S. wheat by the Moroccan Government as partial wage payments to 200,000 workers employed in economic development projects.

Expected to affect the lives of more than a million people, this food-for-peace program is similar to a work-projects program which has been in operation in Tunisia since 1958. Purpose of the grant program, under title II of Public Law 480, is to contribute to Morocco's economic and social development.

Specific projects will include road construction and maintenance, irrigation systems, construction of wells and cisterns, land clearance and development, construction of municipal markets and slaughterhouses, reforestation and tree planting, sanitation, and urban rehabilitation. Approximately 200,000 Moroccan workers will receive up to 50 percent of their total wages in American food supplied under the U.S. Food-for-Peace Program. Equal cash payment will be provided by the Government of Morocco.

Export market value of the wheat is \$14.3 million. The United States will also pay ocean freight costs amounting to an additional \$3.5 million. This is expected to carry the program to June 30, 1962.

IJC Reports on Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project

Press release 276 dated May 1

In a letter from the International Joint Commission dated April 10, 1961, the Department of State has received the Report of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, on the International Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project,¹ dated April 4, 1961. The report, released on May 1, conveys the Commission's findings that the tidal project, either alone or in combination with certain auxiliary power sources, will not permit power to be produced at a price which is competitive with the price of power from alternative available sources.

On August 2, 1956, the Governments of the United States and Canada in a Reference directed the Commission to determine the estimated cost of developing the international tidal power

¹ Copies of the report are available upon request from the International Joint Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

potential of Passamaquoddy Bay and whether the cost of such a development would permit the production of hydroelectric power at an economically feasible price.² Passamaquoddy Bay separates the State of Maine from the Province of New Brunswick on the Atlantic Coast near the mouth of the Bay of Fundy.

The report represents the final conclusions of the Commission in response to the Reference of August 2, 1956, which was submitted to the Commission in accordance with the provisions of article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and in light of the provisions of Public Law 401, 84th Congress, 2d session, approved January 31, 1956.

The Reference further directed the Commission to determine the effects which the project might have on the national and local economies in the area as a result of the proposed construction, maintenance, and operation of the tidal power structures.

The Commission's report finds that because of the relatively high cost of development of the tidal power potential the project would not appreciably affect long-term industrial development in the area. This report points out, however, that there would be substantial short-term benefits to the economies of Maine and New Brunswick during the 6-year construction period which would result from estimated expenditures of over \$200 million for goods and services if the project were carried out.

The Commission finds that the proposed project would have very little effect on the important sardine industry in the St. Croix River estuary of Passamaquoddy Bay and only a minor effect on other fisheries. Were the project to be carried out the Commission notes that relocation and modification of existing fisheries facilities, plus certain modifications in the design of the tidal structures, would minimize damage to existing fisheries.

The report also noted that additional recreation facilities would be created by the formation of two large salt-water lakes and by the structures of the proposed tidal project itself. Navigation conditions in the St. Croix River estuary and at St. Andrews and other ports in the bay area would be improved by the raising of the Passamaquoddy

Bay high pool and by the decrease in the tidal range. In addition, tidal dams, locks, and gates would provide suitable foundation on which an international highway could be built to connect present coastal highways in Maine and New Brunswick.

Nevertheless, the Commission finds that the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project is not economically feasible at the present time when evaluated by conventional methods of economic analysis as applied to hydroelectric projects. The Commission recommends that development of the project be viewed as a long-range possibility having better prospects of realization when other less costly energy resources available in the area will have been fully realized.

The Governments of the United States and Canada are studying the findings and recommendations of the International Joint Commission in the report just submitted and will withhold comment until their studies are completed.

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Established

White House press release dated May 4

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on May 4 issued an Executive order establishing the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The order reactivates, under broadened terms of reference, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which was established by President Eisenhower in 1956,¹ following a recommendation of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. New appointments are being made to the Board because the resignations of the members of the prior Board of Consultants were submitted to and accepted by President Eisenhower before he left office.

Composed of able and experienced individuals from outside the Government, the reactivated Board will be responsible for conducting an objective, independent review of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the Government

² For text of the Reference and background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1956, p. 322.

¹ For background and text of Executive order, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 160, and Feb. 27, 1956, p. 340.

and for reporting periodically to the President with respect to its assessment of the objectives and performance of those activities by the Central Intelligence Agency and the several additional civilian and military agencies engaged therein.

The responsibilities assigned to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board are of a continuing nature and encompass the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort. They are to be distinguished from the *ad hoc* and much more limited study that is presently being made by Gen. Maxwell Taylor.

The members of the Board, in whose qualification and discretion the President has the fullest confidence, are as follows:

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., *chairman*, Chairman of the Corporation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Dr. William O. Baker, vice president, Research, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, N.J.

Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, USAF (ret.), chairman of the board, Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., Los Angeles, Calif.

Dr. William L. Langer, professor of history, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Robert D. Murphy, president, Corning Glass International, New York, N.Y.

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, USA (ret.), president, Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, Inc., New York, N.Y.

J. Patrick Coyne, former official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Council, will continue to serve as executive secretary of the reactivated Board.

It is contemplated that in the near future the President may appoint additional individuals to membership on the Board.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10938¹

ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:


SECTION 1. There is hereby established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The function of the Board shall be to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the United States which are required in the interests of foreign policy and national defense and security.

SEC. 2. In the performance of its advisory duties, the Board shall conduct a continuing review and assessment of all functions of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of other executive departments and agencies having such

or similar responsibilities in the foreign intelligence and related fields, and shall report thereon to the President each six months or more frequently as deemed appropriate. The Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other departments and agencies concerned shall make available to the Board any information with respect to foreign intelligence matters which the Board may require for the purpose of carrying out its responsibilities to the President. The information so supplied to the Board shall be afforded requisite security protection as prescribed by the provisions of applicable laws and regulations.

SEC. 3. Members of the Board shall be appointed from among qualified persons outside the Government and shall receive such compensation and allowances, consonant with law, as may be prescribed hereafter. Such compensation and allowances and any other expenses arising in connection with the work of the Board shall be paid from the appropriation appearing under the heading "Special Projects" in title I of the General Government Matters Appropriation Act, 1961, 74 Stat. 473, and, to the extent permitted by law, from any corresponding appropriation which may be made for subsequent years. Such payments shall be made without regard to the provisions of section 3681 of the Revised Statutes and section 9 of the act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 672 and 673).

SEC. 4. Executive Order No. 10656 of February 6, 1956, is hereby revoked.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 4, 1961.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO BOARD MEMBERS

DEAR -----: I am delighted that you have consented to serve as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board which is being reactivated pursuant to an Executive Order issued earlier today.

I am establishing this Board for the purpose of providing me periodically with independent evaluations of the objectives and conduct of U.S. foreign intelligence activities and of the performance of the several agencies engaged in foreign intelligence and related efforts.

It is my desire that the Board should meet periodically to analyze objectively the work of the Government's foreign intelligence agencies. While the review by the Board will be concerned with all U.S. foreign intelligence activities, I would expect particular attention to be devoted to the performance of those civilian and military intelligence elements of key importance to the Government in the fields of national security and foreign relations. I am especially anxious to obtain the Board's views as to the over-all conduct and progress of the foreign intelligence

¹26 Fed. Reg. 3951.

effort as well as its advice as to any modifications therein which would enhance the acquisition of intelligence essential to the policy making branches of the Government in the areas of national security and foreign relations.

It is my hope that you and the others whom I have invited to serve on the Board will be able to meet with me in the near future to discuss in detail the scope of the work which you have so generously agreed to undertake.

I know that you and your fellow Board members can make a real contribution to the national interest by your service with this body.

Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

THE CONGRESS

Department Supports Legislation To Amend Battle Act

Statement by Under Secretary Ball¹

I am pleased to appear before you this morning in support of S. 1215, which is a bill to amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951. This is the so-called Battle Act, which is a basic part of our security trade control program. I have the responsibility for administering this law.

In his state of the Union address² the President asked the Congress for increased discretion to use economic tools as an aid in reestablishing our historic ties of friendship with the peoples of Eastern Europe. On February 21 in his communication to the Vice President and the Speaker³ he urged the Congress to take early action on legislation to accomplish this purpose. He specifically mentioned this legislation which, in identical form, he had proposed as a Member of the Senate and which the Senate passed on September 12, 1959. The House did not act upon the legislation during that session of the Congress.

The principal change proposed by the bill would be to permit the President, when he considers it important to the security of the United States, to extend economic or financial assistance

to any nation or area except the U.S.S.R., Communist China, north Korea, and north Viet-Nam, regardless of other provisions of the Battle Act.

Please note that this does not include military assistance and that this discretion would not be authorized to apply to a nation whose assistance had been terminated as provided in title I or title II of the act. The proviso in the new bill stipulates that assistance to such nations may be resumed only in accordance with section 104 of the act. That section requires that assistance which has been terminated under the act can be resumed only when the President has determined that the nation is in full compliance with the provisions of the act.

The bill requires the President immediately to report any determination made under the new discretion to this committee and to the Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, as well as to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Currently the President is authorized in section 103(b) of the act to direct the continuance of assistance to a country which knowingly permits shipments of certain strategic goods to the Sino-Soviet bloc, when termination of aid would be detrimental to our security. This bill would authorize the administrator of the act instead of the President to make such determinations if a strategic shipment to a country receiving assistance under this newly authorized discretion of the President is involved. In other words, if the President decides that it is important to the security of the United States to provide some economic or financial assistance to country X, then in keeping with my responsibility for administering the law, I would be authorized to consider and, where appropriate, to direct the continuation of assistance to any country which has made shipments of strategic goods to country X, so long as those shipments do not include arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic energy materials.

There is one other change in the act which is proposed by this bill. It is considered to be a housekeeping matter. It provides new language for section 102 of the act in order to delete the obsolete reference to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and to provide that the administrator of this act shall be either the Secretary of State, as is presently the case, or such other officer as the President may designate.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Apr. 25 (press release 255).

² BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1961, p. 207.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 27, 1961, p. 444.

The new authority sought in this bill would promote the interests of the United States since it would provide the President with essential flexibility to enable him to deal rapidly with developing situations which afford us opportunities to advance objectives of our foreign policy. It is not possible for us now to anticipate and to spell out all of the possible uses to which this authority might be put. In retrospect we can see that this flexible authority would have enabled the United States to have dealt more promptly, and thus perhaps more effectively, with the situation which developed in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1956.

As of this moment I can cite as a possible use of the authority requested in this bill the disposition of the accumulated balances of Polish currency acquired by the United States as a result of surplus agricultural sales. With the exception of limited uses of these funds for certain United States expenses in Poland, the funds are immobilized and idle because of existing provisions of the Battle Act which restrict their use for projects in Poland. The change proposed by this bill would enable us to use these funds on what the President referred to in his state of the Union address as projects of peace which will demonstrate our abiding friendship and interest in the people of Poland.

The authority would also be useful in our efforts to provide appropriate aid to certain of the newly independent countries. Some of these countries have not yet developed the requisite administrative apparatus to maintain adequate or effective control over exports. Others are very jealous of their newly acquired independence and might feel that entering into an agreement with us to set up trade controls, as a condition of our assistance, would be an infringement of their sovereignty.

Under the terms of this bill the authority can be used only after a finding by the President that the assistance under consideration is important to the security of the United States. It is anticipated that this authority would not need to be used frequently, but the degree of discretion provided by the amendment would enable us to act promptly to assure more effective action in the type of situations described.

I hope the committee will again act favorably on the legislation.

Approval Sought for U.S. Acceptance of 1954 Oil Pollution Convention

*Statement by Abram Chayes
Legal Adviser¹*

I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations to support United States acceptance of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil.²

This committee reported favorably on the convention on June 2, 1960,³ but the Senate did not take final action with respect to it prior to adjournment of the 86th Congress. With the convention again before the committee for consideration, the Department of State wishes to affirm its support of the convention and to urge that the committee renew its recommendation that the Senate advise and consent to acceptance of the convention subject to the understanding and reservations and with the recommendation set forth in the committee's report of June 2.⁴

The purpose of the convention is to prevent the pollution of the seas by oil and oily wastes by regulating the discharge thereof by tankers and other ships. The regulations imposed by the convention are directed solely at seagoing ships registered in the territory of a contracting party which are over 500 tons gross tonnage and are not being used as naval auxiliaries, in whaling, or in navigating the Great Lakes and certain tributaries.

The United States, like many other governments, has laws prohibiting the discharge of oil and oily wastes within territorial waters. The convention would not change our present law with respect to territorial waters; the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 will continue to apply. It will require implementing legislation to prohibit discharge by ships of American registry of oil or oily wastes in the prohibited zones beyond our territorial waters, to provide for the maintenance and examination of oil record books, and to prescribe penalties. Draft legislation for this purpose has been

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Apr. 25 (press release 257).

² S. Ex. C, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

³ For a statement by Thomas C. Mann before the committee on May 17, 1960, see BULLETIN of June 13, 1960, p. 976.

⁴ S. Ex. Rept. 6, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

prepared and is ready for submission to Congress as soon as Senate advice and consent is given. The United States instrument of acceptance of the convention will not be deposited until the necessary legislation is passed.

The convention contains a settlement-of-disputes provision of the type which in recent decades has been included in a considerable number of bilateral and multilateral instruments to which the United States has become a party. Article XIII provides that any dispute between the contracting parties as to the interpretation or application of the convention may be referred to the International Court of Justice. I should like to affirm that a specific provision of this type in a treaty is not subject to the self-judging domestic-jurisdiction reservation (the so-called Connally Amendment) to the general acceptance by the United States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. I agree wholeheartedly with the statement of the former Legal Adviser of the Department and the analysis of this committee as set forth on pages 8 and 9 of the committee report on the oil pollution convention.

At the same time it may be emphasized that the question of whether the Connally Amendment would be operative is not a matter of any real pertinence in this case. The oil pollution convention is a traditional-type maritime treaty dealing with matters of legitimate international concern. It regulates the discharge of oil and oily wastes by seagoing ships, setting up prohibited zones for such discharge, and dealing with discharge facilities, oil record books on board ship, and enforcement measures. It is difficult to conceive that any matter of dispute arising under the convention could be construed as being within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of this country. Matters that might arise under this convention would be matters which this Government would normally want to have submitted to the Court. It would be in the public interest to be able to submit them to the Court without the restriction imposed by reciprocal operation of a self-judging reservation.

The Department of State continues to recommend that United States acceptance of the convention be accompanied by an understanding con-

cerning the supremacy of United States law within United States territorial waters, a reservation that the United States shall not be obliged to construct, operate, or maintain shore facilities for disposing of oily wastes, a reservation that amendments to the convention shall not be binding on the United States until accepted by it, and certain recommendations for future amendment. These are discussed and approved in the committee's report of last session (Executive Report No. 6, pages 5-8).

The committee was informed by a letter of April 20, 1961,^{*} from Assistant Secretary Brooks Hays that two developments have occurred with respect to the convention since it was considered here last year. Poland has deposited its instrument of acceptance, bringing to 13 the number of countries which are parties, and a conference has been scheduled by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization to be held from March 28 to April 12, 1962. The purpose of the conference would be to review the situation in regard to oil pollution of the sea and the working of the 1954 convention and to consider any amendments proposed by governments and the practicability of securing complete avoidance of discharge of persistent oils into the sea.

As long as the United States remains outside the convention it has little or no opportunity to improve the convention by amendments. The forthcoming conference will offer the only opportunity for some years to make the changes desired. By completing the ratification process the United States would be in a better position to obtain acceptance of its recommended changes at the conference.

The convention continues to have the support of the interagency National Committee for Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil and of groups interested in the conservation of birds and other wildlife. It is, of course, of direct benefit to coastal areas and resorts adversely affected by oil pollution of the seas. The Department of State recommends that the Senate approve early acceptance of the convention in accordance with the committee's recommendation of last year.

^{*} Not printed.

Central Treaty Organization Holds Ninth Ministerial Meeting

The ninth session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held at Ankara April 27-28. Following are texts of a statement made by Secretary Rusk at the opening session on April 27 and the final communique, together with statements made by Secretary Rusk on April 25 upon his departure from Washington and on April 26 upon his arrival at Ankara and a list of the U.S. observer delegation.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

I have been greatly honored and encouraged by the message delivered here today on behalf of His Excellency the Head of State and Government of Turkey.

It has been particularly interesting for me, as one of the new participants in these meetings, indeed the newest boy of all here, to hear the views of the distinguished representatives of the member nations of the Central Treaty Organization.

I think it is a measure of the continuing vigor of CENTO that my colleagues, statesmen who carry heavy burdens on behalf of their governments and peoples, have gathered in this historic city to reaffirm their common purpose and determination. I am especially happy to be here with them at this time.

It is a pleasure to have this opportunity to see and confer with my old friend, Foreign Minister Selim Sarper of Turkey. He served his country in the United Nations with greatest distinction for a number of years. We are grateful for the warm hospitality shown by our host, the Government of Turkey, and for the fine arrangements which it, along with the loyal and efficient CENTO Secretariat, have made on our behalf. I am enjoying

the chance to visit along with other Turkish leaders during these days.

I am pleased to have the honor of becoming personally acquainted with Foreign Minister [Hosein] Qods-Nakhai of Iran and to meet again with Foreign Minister [Manzur] Qadir of Pakistan and the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, both of whom I have had recent occasion to see in distant places.

Anyone who surveys the present world scene must conclude that there are certain points of real danger, but it would be blind or foolish for us not to see also the great promise of the future, the promise mentioned by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The problem of our times is to meet, to deal with, and to remove the points of danger, but even more vigorously to build on the promise.

The free world is growing steadily in vitality and in the development of its potentials to improve the economic and social standards of its people. There is abroad in the world a new vigor and liveliness in the hopes of free men and in the measures being undertaken to bring about their realization. It is all the more remarkable that such gains are being made at a time when free nations must devote a considerable portion of their resources to defense purposes to provide for the common defense while promoting the general welfare.

Self-defense is a prime responsibility of all nations. If it is to be effective and adequate, cooperation is essential. This is the underlying truth of CENTO. The zeal and dedication which CENTO members have shown in their efforts to find solutions to common problems is most impressive. I also find impressive what has been accomplished by the Organization through its

several committees. The going has not always been easy, but hurdles are to be surmounted, not accepted. Though still young in years, CENTO has weathered its early trials; it has remained undeterred by verbal attack, it has shown dedication to tasks at hand, and it has achieved results in a number of fields of endeavor which inspire respect for its past and confidence in its future.

These efforts have never been, as one of my colleagues has pointed out, nor will be, aggressive, for CENTO challenges no one. It directs its efforts toward a common defense against those who might seek to challenge its partners.

But CENTO's energies are wisely not limited to military defense alone. Its members have understood the need to direct their individual and collective efforts to protecting the institutions of a free society and obtaining freedom from want and fear. They are knitting the bonds of friendship and respect and also the bonds of common aspirations as they work together to deal effectively with the economic and social problems that beset their citizens, as do men everywhere.

In these high tasks of defense and development the United States is glad to associate itself with the members of CENTO. The United States has sought in the past to play a helpful part in supporting the member states' cooperative defense efforts and remains today as convinced as ever that collaboration continues to be the surest means for achieving this objective. We pledge our continued cooperation for our mutual security in the knowledge that security for all means security for each.

As President Kennedy recently stated,¹ we live at a very special moment in history, when many parts of the world, including the area in which the CENTO regional members are situated, are determined to maintain their independence and to modernize their ways of life. The needs are enormous, not merely to resist the pressures of those who would extend their influence through direct and subversive means but even more importantly to enable economic growth and political democracy to develop hand in hand. It is our continued purpose, together with others who have also been heavily blessed with the bounties of an industrial age, to work with those not yet so well

avored who seek through mobilization of their own energies, resources, and plans to meet the requirements of today and the needs of tomorrow.

We of the United States observer delegation are pleased to be here with our friends. I bring to you the greetings of the President of the United States, and we look forward to constructive deliberations.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Ninth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization was held in Ankara on April 27 and 28, 1961. The delegations from countries participating in this meeting were led by:—

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| (i) H.E. Mr. Hossein Ghods | Foreign Minister of Iran |
| Nakhai | |
| (ii) H.E. Mr. Manzur Qadir | Minister for External Affairs, Pakistan |
| (iii) H.E. Mr. Selim Sarper | Foreign Minister of Turkey |
| (iv) The Right Honourable | Secretary of State for |
| The Earl of Home | Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom |
| (v) The Honourable Dean | Secretary of State, United States of America |
| Rusk | |

The Foreign Minister of Turkey, as host, was in the chair.

The Session was inaugurated by a message of welcome from the Turkish Head of State and Government, General Gürsel, which was read by General Fahri Özdilek, the Deputy Prime Minister.

The Council noted that the year intervening since its last meeting in April, 1960, had been marked by close cooperation and unity of basic objectives among the CENTO partners.

The Council considered the international situation and the increase of tension in many areas of the world. They observed with satisfaction, however, that apart from the continuation of hostile propaganda, there had been no encroachment on the integrity and independence of the CENTO region.

The Council were informed of the efforts being made to achieve political solutions of the many difficult issues facing the nations of the world. They recognised that there are many problems in which there is an urgent need for a demonstration by the Sino-Soviet Bloc of a readiness to respect the independence and sovereignty of nations and to use the international machinery which is available for arriving at settlements through negotiation. In particular they regard an early agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests as an essential first step on the road to disarmament.

The Council reviewed the economic work of the Organization and recognised the good results achieved in technical assistance and mutual cooperation in communications, agriculture, science and technical education, health and trade. The Council reaffirmed keen interest in steady progress towards the early completion of ade-

¹ For President Kennedy's message to Congress on foreign aid, see BULLETIN of Apr. 10, 1961, p. 507.

quate roads, railways, ports and telecommunications between the regional countries of CENTO.

The Council took note of the report made by the Military Committee, and agreed to appoint a Commander—CENTO Military Staff, to improve the co-ordination of defence planning among the participating states.

In approving the Report of the Secretary General, the Council expressed their gratitude to Mr. M. O. A. Baig for the distinguished services which he has rendered. The Council warmly thanked the Government of Turkey for its generous hospitality in putting at CENTO's disposal the historic Grand National Assembly building as a temporary headquarters for the International Secretariat and the Combined Military Planning Staff pending consideration of a permanent site.

The Council decided that the next meeting will be held in London in April, 1962.

MR. RUSK'S DEPARTURE STATEMENT

Press release 260 dated April 25

I am looking forward to representing the United States as its observer at the ninth Ministerial Council meeting of the Central Treaty Organization, to be held in Ankara, April 27-29. As in the past troubled years, CENTO continues to play a vital role in the collective security of its member states and toward advancing the welfare of their peoples. We here in the United States recognize the importance of these efforts and will continue to give them our support.

I further welcome this conference because it provides occasion to visit Turkey, a nation to which we in the United States feel bound by ties of friendship, common interest, and alliance. The conference will also afford opportunities to confer with the foreign ministers of other countries which we similarly esteem as close friends.

MR. RUSK'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT

Press release 265 dated April 27

I am happy to come to Ankara to represent the United States at the ninth session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization and look forward to becoming personally acquainted with the officials of the CENTO governments who will be participating in the conference.

I also welcome this first opportunity as Secretary of State to visit our staunch friend and ally, the Republic of Turkey, and to meet its leading

officials. As the destinies of our two nations have grown more closely linked in past years, the respect of the people of the United States for the people of Turkey and our interest in the welfare of the Turkish nation have become ever stronger and deeper.

The CENTO meeting will be the first such gathering in 12 months and should provide an opportunity for a useful exchange of views. The United States has seen with gratification how the member governments of CENTO have continued to seek joint approaches to common problems in the political, economic, and military fields, steadily building up a community of interest which carries promise for the future.

CENTO is a purely defensive alliance, dedicated to the preservation of the freedom of its members and to the cause of world peace. The significance of such an association was highlighted by Secretary General [M. O. A.] Baig when he pointed out that no member of the major free-world regional defense alliances has been the object of Communist-bloc territorial aggression. Recent events in other parts of the world have demonstrated the urgent need for maintaining our defenses. At the same time we hope that the future course of events may permit us to turn our attention increasingly toward activities promoting the development of the region and the well-being of its peoples. The United States is proud to be associated with the member countries of CENTO in these endeavors.

On behalf of my Government, I should like also to express our appreciation to the Government of Turkey for acting as our host on this occasion and for all of the support and assistance given by Turkey as host to the CENTO organization since 1958.

U.S. OBSERVER DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on April 21 (press release 243) that Secretary Rusk would head the U.S. observer delegation to the ninth Ministerial Council session of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), held at Ankara April 27-29.

Raymond A. Hare, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and U.S. Observer in the Council Deputies, served as alternate U.S. observer.

The senior advisers of the delegation included:

William P. Bundy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense

George McGhee, Counselor of the Department of State

Lt. Gen. Elmer J. Rogers, USAF, U.S. Representative,

Permanent Military Deputies Group, Ankara

William M. Rountree, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan

Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Roger W. Tubby, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Edward T. Wailes, U.S. Ambassador to Iran

The members of CENTO are Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and the United Kingdom. The United States, while not a full member, supports the Organization and is associated with most of its activities. CENTO headquarters are at Ankara. The previous session was held at Tehran in April 1960.

General Assembly Adopts New Resolutions on the Congo

Following is a statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative in the General Assembly, made in plenary session on April 14, together with texts of two resolutions adopted on April 15.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S. delegation press release 3695

As the Assembly comes to the conclusion of its consideration of the Congo, it would be well, I think, if we reviewed again what we are trying to do.

The United Nations is concerned, as we see it, with only one thing—how to help the leaders of the Congo create a peaceful, a viable, and ultimately prosperous home for all of their peoples. This task is difficult enough, for the fact is that the leaders of the Congo—in Léopoldville, in Elisabethville, in Stanleyville—have not yet achieved agreement. The danger of war still threatens this unhappy country.

Owing, however, to the calamitous events of the last 9 months in the Congo, we cannot divorce the Congo issue from its broad international set-

ting—a setting unhappily marked by divisions similar to those which bedevil the Congo's own internal efforts at pacification. We cannot be sure that the Congo's problems can be kept confined to the Congo. We cannot be sure that violent crisis there—or even chronic disagreement—will not be projected into the wider arena of the world. And we know from history what such broadening spirals of hostility can do to us all.

What can we do? In one sense our task is not too difficult to define. It is to promote policies aimed at sensible, realizable compromise policies which supply steady pressure toward reconciliation and agreement. No one man, group, or interest in this conflict can expect to achieve every objective. Each must yield something, or there will be no agreement.

If the more extreme groups in Elisabethville and Stanleyville would move back toward the center, it might encourage President Kasavubu, who is recognized by all Congo factions as the Chief of State, not to participate in the liquidation of the Congo but to offer himself as a center for reconciliation and negotiation aimed at achieving a federal solution.

It should encourage the leaders of the Congo, too, to understand the role of the United Nations not as an external coercive force but as the only instrument available to control the warring factions while time is gained for mediation and agreement. Attacks upon the policies, upon the purposes and the personalities of the United Nations are not worthy of responsible African statesmen and impair the world's respect for them. And if the United Nations were now removed, civil war might wipe out the last hopes of reconciliation.

Likewise, whatever temporary advantage Belgium may expect to gain from the continuance of direct influence in Katanga or in Léopoldville will be more than canceled by the disastrous consequences of long disorder. The sooner the withdrawal of all extraneous and unnecessary Belgian personnel can be completed, the sooner the task of conciliation can go ahead.

Nineteen-Power Resolution

With these thoughts in mind, I turn to the resolution tabled by 19 members, Document A/L.339 [and Add. 1-5], which focuses attention on "the

continued presence of Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers and mercenaries" in the Congo. In its resolution of February 21 the Security Council urged "that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military . . . personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command. . . ."¹ In our view this resolution, among other things, gave the Secretary-General the necessary mandate he had so long needed to work more actively toward a solution of that problem. One result of this new mandate was the opening of negotiations between a representative of the Secretary-General and the Belgian Government.

The General Assembly has been informed of these negotiations in Brussels, and we remain hopefully confident that as a result of these negotiations, as well as negotiations with the Congolese authorities, rapid progress will be made on the withdrawal from the Congo of all foreign military personnel and mercenaries. In a document² circulated by the representative of Belgium the General Assembly was informed that his Government has confirmed its acceptance of the Security Council resolution of February 21 and has decided to withdraw, insofar as Belgium is concerned, the personnel referred to and to assist the United Nations in urging Congolese authorities to accept the viewpoint of the United Nations on this question.

As we examined the resolution in Document A/L.339, we noted that on a number of critical points the language was inconsistent with the facts. The second and third preambular paragraphs have it that *the* central factor in the present grave situation in the Congo is the continued presence of foreign nationals in the Congo and that the Government of Belgium has refused to comply with the most recent Security Council resolution. We agree that the continued presence of foreign nationals is one of the central factors, but we do not agree that their presence is *the* central factor. I will presently touch on other aspects which, in our view, are no less important. But from what I have said on the question of Belgian compliance with the Security Council resolution, it should be

clear why my delegation cannot support the language contained in the second paragraph nor in the first operative paragraph of this resolution.

Coming to the second operative paragraph, we feel that the imposition of a 21-day deadline with a strong hint of sanctions to follow in case of failure would only make any solution of the Congo problem more difficult.

Having these views and because of our active collaboration with the sponsors of the Security Council resolution of February 21, we therefore approached the sponsors of this resolution with suggested amendments which we felt would strengthen their resolution by bringing it up to date, by encouraging a broadening of negotiations, and by providing a resolution which all members could support and which would enable this General Assembly to bring the force of its moral pressure to bear unanimously and more effectively.

But the cosponsors of this draft resolution rejected these suggestions, I am sorry to say. Accordingly, the United States will have to vote against the draft resolution contained in Document A/L.339.

As far as the United Nations efforts in the Congo are concerned, one of the most significant contributions to reason was the issuance of the report³ of the Conciliation Commission, in our opinion.

Africa, a great new continent coming to freedom, will seek in every direction for new policies, for new directions, and certainly we in America would wish to put no limits on the Africans' free search. It is their policy, it is their continent. They must decide what forms and structures best fit the emerging "African personality." But we do not believe that the search can be fruitfully made against a background of anarchy.

The restoration of stability is a precondition of all else, and what we seek in this fateful debate is to bring the nations back to the state of mind in which conciliation and compromise are seen to be the only safe avenues to the future.

What is at stake is not our rivalries and our voting blocs. It is not the afflictions of the cold war. It is not ideological victories or nationalist trials of strength. It is quite simply to attempt to bring peace back to this country. This can only be by way of compromise, and I believe a

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 13, 1961, p. 368.

² U.N. doc. S/4782.

³ U.N. doc. A/4711 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1 and 2.

working compromise exists in the proposals of the Conciliation Commission.

Conclusions of Conciliation Commission Report

The United States fully endorses its major conclusions. In particular, we note that the Commission found:

First, a sincere desire to reach agreement with their opponents and achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis on the part of many of the Congolese leaders.

Second, that many of the criticisms of the *loi fondamentale* are well founded. It is convinced that this law is incomplete and ill-adapted to the needs of the Congo. Consequently, the Commission found that its amendment or replacement by a new constitution as soon as possible would contribute greatly to a solution of the crisis.

We believe the United Nations ought to encourage the Congolese to continue their efforts to reach agreement among themselves on a new constitution, bearing in mind that until such agreement is reached and receives popular endorsement it remains desirable that all concerned uphold the fundamental law as the basic law of the republic.

Third, the Commission considers it essential that the Congolese army and other armed groups now operating in the territory should be insulated from politics and reorganized. It suggests this reorganization be carried out with the assistance of the United Nations through a comprehensive scheme under a national defense council to be set up by the central government. During the period when the armed forces are being reorganized, the United Nations Forces in the Congo should assist the authorities in the maintenance of law and order throughout the entire territory in cooperation with the local authorities, and also to help protect the territorial integrity of the state.

The concept of reorganization of these forces has already been accepted by the Security Council. There can certainly be no quarrel with this recommendation.

Fourth, the Conciliation Commission came to the conclusion that under present conditions a federal form of government can alone preserve the country's unity and integrity. It believed that it would not be impossible for the Congolese leaders to reach an agreement on such a constitution. However, the Commission believed that this

was a matter upon which only the Congolese people and Parliament can finally pronounce.

The United States endorses this conclusion as formulated by the Conciliation Commission, it being understood that this is a problem for the Congolese alone to decide.

Fifth, the Commission condemned "the inhumane practice of resorting to executions to eliminate political opponents or in reprisals." It called for the immediate release of all political prisoners and the cessation of "arbitrary arrests and executions of political leaders."

The United States supports this suggestion utterly.

Sixth, the Commission also found that the reconvening of Parliament is essential to reach any solution to the political crisis and urged that adequate measures should be taken by the United Nations Force to give protection to such members of Parliament as might desire it.

We concur fully with that, too.

As the Conciliation Commission pointed out, there have been a number of significant events in the Congo since its work was completed. One of these is the Tananarive conference. We wish to make it clear that the United States does not regard the conference as having taken *decisions*. We regard it as a first and indispensable step in the process of consultation among the Congolese leaders.

But the work of the consultation is far from complete, and we do not believe that either cynicism or despair about the progress of reconciliation is justified. That conference was merely the beginning of the search for new political institutions to replace those established at the outset, not a year ago. We assume that after a series of meetings take place among all of the leaders, new institutions and arrangements will be submitted for popular approval, either by direct consultation of all the people or by Parliament acting as a constituent assembly. The method is up to the Congolese themselves, but we believe it is safe to say that international acceptance can come only after indication that the people of the Congo have somehow indicated their approval of the new arrangements.

For the present, and while conciliation efforts continue, it is the view of the United States Government that there has been no change in the Congo's international position. We recognize the

Congo as a single, unified state, governed under the provisions of the fundamental law bequeathed to it by Belgium, with President Kasavubu as its only legally appointed head.

With these views in mind, it should be clear why the United States warmly supports the resolution contained in Document A/L.340. We believe this resolution embodies the principal findings of the Conciliation Commission, whose studies I am sure will be found most important in the historic perspective of the solution of this grave problem.

Let me make it quite clear that neither the United States nor any other nation has the right to dictate precisely how the Congo should resolve its political structure. That, of course, is the prerogative of the Congolese. But the United States, because of its own history, has a deep sympathy for the problems of organizing a young country along democratic lines. We had to find a way of uniting 13 disparate states in this continent of ours. The Congo has had to find a way of uniting several provinces. Our own experience with both federation and with confederation naturally makes us partial to federation. We had to learn the hard way that only true federation could do the job, and we think the Congolese will also soon discover this.

I need not spell out the shape of such a solution. It is for the Congolese to devise it themselves. But we should spell out the consequences of the alternatives.

Amendments Submitted by Seven African States

I turn to the amendments submitted by seven African states in Document A/L.342.

The United States supported wholeheartedly the resolution adopted by the Security Council on February 21. We believe that resolution is as valid today as it was then, and we believe that resolution has a particular importance because it gave the Secretary-General for the first time a sufficient mandate. For this reason we will not be able to support the proposed deletion in the first operative paragraph of Resolution 340 of the words "more particularly the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961."

The second proposed amendment puts forward new language for operative paragraph 5 with which we do not disagree. Having in mind, however, the report of the Conciliation Commission and its conclusions, concerning the need for a

meeting of the Parliament under conditions of safety for all in order that the constitutional structure might be considered and, if necessary, altered in accordance with the fundamental law, it is natural that we should support the original language of operative paragraph 5 of the resolution. There is also a question in our mind of the propriety of the General Assembly's calling upon the Chief of State along the lines in the proposed amendment. We do not question the authority of the Chief of State, President Kasavubu, to convene the Parliament. In fact, he clearly has that authority under the fundamental law. For these reasons the United States delegation will abstain on this portion of the amendment.

The third portion of the amendment would affect the title of the seven-member commission to be designated by the President of the General Assembly to assist the Congolese leaders to achieve reconciliation and end the political crisis. We agree with the sponsors that a commission of assistance is a more responsive name, and for this reason we will vote in favor of this portion of the amendments contained in A/L.342.

The remaining draft resolution is that submitted by the Soviet Union in Document A/L.341. If the General Assembly passes Resolution 340 the Soviet draft resolution would seem superfluous, since with one exception the Soviet draft contains nothing which will not have been approved in the other. The exception is, of course, the 21-day deadline for the convening of Parliament of the Republic of the Congo. This insertion we believe is unwarranted and manifest interference in the domestic affairs of a member state. If, therefore, this resolution comes to the vote, the United States will be obliged to vote against it.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Resolution 1600⁴

The General Assembly,

Having considered the situation in the Republic of the Congo,

Gravely concerned at the danger of civil war and foreign intervention and at the threat to international peace and security,

Taking note of the report of the Conciliation Commis-

⁴ U.N. doc. A/RES/1600 (XV) (A/L.340 and Add. 1-4 and Add. 3/Corr. 1); adopted in plenary on Apr. 15 by a vote of 60 (including U.S.) to 16, with 23 abstentions.

sion appointed in pursuance of paragraph 3 of its resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960,

Mindful of the desire of the Congolese people for a solution of the crisis in the Congo through national reconciliation and return to constitutionality without delay,

Noting with concern the many difficulties that have arisen in the way of effective functioning of the United Nations operation in the Congo,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 1474 (ES-IV) and the Security Council resolutions on the situation in the Congo, more particularly the Council resolution of 21 February 1961;

2. *Calls upon* the Congolese authorities concerned to desist from attempting a military solution to their problems and to resolve them by peaceful means;

3. *Considers it essential* that necessary and effective measures be taken by the Secretary-General immediately to prevent the introduction of arms, military equipment and supplies into the Congo, except in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations;

4. *Urges* the immediate release of all members of Parliament and members of provincial assemblies and all other political leaders now under detention;

5. *Urges* the convening of Parliament without delay, with safe conduct and security extended to the members of Parliament by the United Nations, so that Parliament may take the necessary decisions concerning the formation of a national government and on the future constitutional structure of the Republic of the Congo in accordance with the constitutional processes laid down in the *Loi fondamentale*;

6. *Decides* to appoint a Commission of Conciliation of seven members to be designated by the President of the General Assembly to assist the Congolese leaders to achieve reconciliation and to end the political crisis;

7. *Urges* the Congolese authorities to co-operate fully in the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly and to accord all facilities essential to the performance by the United Nations of functions envisaged in those resolutions.

Resolution 1599⁵

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1474 (ES-IV) of 20 September 1960 and the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 July, 22 July and 9 August 1960 and, more particularly, that of 21 February 1961, urging the immediate withdrawal and evacuation of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries,

Deploing that despite all these requests the Government of Belgium has not yet complied with the resolutions and that such non-compliance has mainly contributed to the further deterioration of the situation in the Congo,

Convinced that the central factor in the present grave situation in the Congo is the continued presence of Bel-

gian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers, and mercenaries, in total disregard of repeated resolutions of the United Nations,

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to accept its responsibilities as a Member of the United Nations and to comply fully and promptly with the will of the Security Council and of the General Assembly;

2. *Decides* that all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries, shall be completely withdrawn and evacuated;

3. *Calls upon* all States to exert their influence and extend their co-operation to effect the implementation of the present resolution.

Question of the Future of Ruanda-Urundi

Following is a statement made by Jonathan B. Bingham, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, in Committee IV (Trusteeship) on April 10, together with the text of a resolution adopted in plenary session on April 21.

STATEMENT BY MR. BINGHAM

U.S. delegation press release 3686

The United States is gravely concerned with the course of developments in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi during the recent past. We are even more concerned that if these developments continue—if for example there is no opportunity given the people of this territory to express their will openly through democratic processes in the very near future—the same trends which disturb us so much today may continue until the point of no return has been reached. If this should happen, all of us will have been party to a failure by the United Nations and we shall not have discharged our duty in accordance with our stated views as contained in chapter XII of the charter.

Last fall, when the General Assembly selected Ambassador [Max H.] Dorsinville [of Haiti] as chairman of the Commission on Ruanda-Urundi, my delegation applauded, confident that no finer choice could have been made. Here we have a man of unquestioned integrity and sensitivity, a man who visited Ruanda-Urundi with the 1957 visiting mission, a man who served for years on the Trusteeship Council—indeed a distinguished President of that Council. To serve with him,

⁵ U.N. doc. A/RES/1599(XV) (A/L. 339 and Add. 1-5); adopted in plenary on Apr. 15 by a vote of 61 to 5, with 33 abstentions (including U.S.).

the Assembly, also with great wisdom, selected two other distinguished and eminently qualified persons, Mayi Rahnema of Iran and Ernest Gasou of Togo. One would have thought that such a Commission would surely succeed in its mission, and yet the truth is that the Commission did not succeed. It did not because the illegal coup d'etat that had taken place before its arrival presented it with an inflexible political situation and because it lacked the one essential ingredient without which success was impossible: full cooperation by the representatives of the Administering Authority in the territory.

From the statement of Ambassador Dorsinville, and from the documents we have before us, we can readily, and, I think, logically, conclude that the Belgian Government has been prepared to extend the hand of cooperation, whereas the local administrators in Ruanda-Urundi have been more inclined to withdraw it. Unfortunately we are unable to read minds, and we therefore have no alternative but to reach conclusions based on actual events. The Government of Belgium cannot avoid full responsibility for the administration of the territory, and if it is true that its local administration is allowed to negate official Belgian policy, then the Belgian Government itself must bear responsibility and should, in our view, take immediate steps to insure that its policy is carried out within this territory until it achieves independence. We are confident that it can and will do so.

Ambassador Dorsinville pointed out with considerable eloquence that the United Nations is today faced with a completely new situation. It is that situation to which we must now address ourselves. We cannot change what has happened in the past, but what we do here can have a vital effect on the future.

The draft resolution¹ which is now before you is not in all respects as we would have preferred to see it. But other cosponsors no doubt feel the same way for different reasons. In the drafting of this proposed resolution, there has been a spirit of mutual accommodation among the cosponsors, and we believe it represents a reasonable compromise of several points of view.

This draft resolution has but one aim, that by 1962 Ruanda-Urundi should achieve full national

independence in accordance with the freely expressed will of its people in that territory. We do not have, nor should others have, any favored political party within this territory. All parties must be free to participate in elections without any pressure or fear obstructing either campaigning or balloting. The election procedures, including the method of balloting, must be satisfactory to the U.N. Commission, reconstituted as a group of three U.N. Commissioners.

Before these events can take place, however, there must be a general and complete amnesty of political prisoners and return of the refugees. The distinguished representative of Belgium told us that the refugee problem was in the process of solution. It is our hope that the efforts of the Administering Authority in this respect will be intensified.

And what about the amnesty? It is clear to all of us, I am sure, that this above all other problems is the key to the holding of a fair referendum on the Mwami and fair legislative elections. In its Resolution 1579 the General Assembly called for "a complete and unconditional amnesty." This recommendation has not been fully carried out, in part, at least, because of a difference of opinion as to its meaning. Was it, for example, intended that the amnesty should be extended to those in prison for crimes not related to the 1959 troubles or to other essentially political activities? We think not. Or was it intended that this amnesty should be extended to persons who had been convicted of actual political killing? Again, we think not. It would be hard to argue that political assassins should be allowed to go scot free.

Building on a suggestion made in the original statement of the distinguished representative of Belgium, the present draft resolution sets up a tripartite committee to review with the Administering Authority those cases in which the individuals concerned have been convicted or charged with serious crimes such as homicide. We understand that there are only about a dozen of these cases, of which about half are in prison and the rest out of the country. The committee is to consist of one person selected by three disinterested governments to be designated by the General Assembly.

Except for the small group convicted of, or charged with, serious crimes, all others whose misdoings, if any, were connected with political

¹ U.N. doc. A/C.4/L.678.

activities should be amnestied automatically and immediately. Once this process has been completed, the basic hindrance to fair elections will have been removed. All political parties will then be able to campaign openly and actively under conditions of order and tranquillity. The United Nations Commissioners would be on the spot to supervise this process.

In suggesting the month of August for the referendum and the elections we have set the dates as early as we believe is practicable in view of all that must be done beforehand, including the return of the refugees, the amnesty for political offenders, and the necessary preparations for the elections themselves.

My delegation believes it to be important that, in order to avoid confusion in the minds of the voters, all too many of whom are unfortunately illiterate, it is important that the referendum on the Mwami be held separately from the legislative elections, preferably a week or two later. But we have been willing to leave this matter open, to be determined on the spot by the Administering Authority and the U.N. Commissioners.

We realize that there exists today if not animosity, at least tension, between the members of the United Nations Commission and the local administration in the territory. We have no illusions whatsoever about the difficulty of eliminating these tensions, but we also know that the problem which is Ruanda-Urundi is of overriding importance.

In all earnestness we appeal to the Belgian Government and its officials to cooperate without reservation with the chosen representatives of the United Nations. One fact must be accepted, and this is that the United Nations, and by that I mean almost all of its members, are interested in a just and lasting solution which can be achieved only through open and free democratic processes. We would also appeal to the members of the United Nations Commission to rise above an understandable feeling that their task in the future will be an impossible one. Lesser men could not do this. We appeal to all to cooperate in the true meaning of that word.

In conclusion, we appeal to all members of this committee to base their judgment and their evaluation on what is practical and not on what may be theoretically desirable, on what is fact and not what we might wish fact to be.

We believe that the draft resolution is, in the main, constructive and that, if carried out, the people of Ruanda-Urundi will be able, fairly and freely, to express their views for the future and will have taken a long step toward their independence.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the General Assembly's Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,²

Recalling its resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV) of 20 December 1960 concerning the future of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi,

Having received the interim report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi³ appointed under resolution 1579 (XV),

Regretting the failure of the Administering Authority to implement fully and effectively the terms of resolution 1579 (XV), the resistance to such implementation by the local representatives of the Administering Authority in Ruanda-Urundi and their failure to co-operate fully and effectively with the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi,

Regretting the *de facto* recognition by the Administering Authority of governmental bodies in Ruanda which were established by irregular and unlawful means and which cannot be regarded as fully representative of all segments of the population in the absence of free and fair elections on the basis of direct universal adult suffrage, as envisaged in resolution 1579 (XV),

Regretting also the setting up of governmental bodies in Urundi on the basis of communal elections, contrary to the assurances given by the Administering Authority that communal elections were purely administrative and had no political character,

Noting the several statements of the representatives of the Administering Authority conveying assurances that it will co-operate fully with the United Nations in Ruanda-Urundi,

Having heard the views of the petitioners from Ruanda-Urundi,

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the members of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi for their conscientious discharge of the duties entrusted to them under General Assembly resolutions 1579 (XV) and 1580 (XV);

2. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium as the Administering Authority to ensure that the provisions of

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/1605 (XV) (A/C.4/L.678, as amended); adopted in plenary session on Apr. 21 by a vote of 86 to 1 (Belgium), with 4 abstentions (France, Portugal, Spain, and Union of South Africa).

² U.N. doc. A/RES/1514 (XV); for text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1961, p. 27.

³ U.N. doc. A/4706 and Add. 1.

resolution 1579 (XV) are fully implemented by its representatives in Ruanda-Urundi before the legislative elections;

3. *Recognizes* that the Government of Belgium is alone responsible for the administration of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi and accountable to the United Nations, and that its responsibilities as Administering Authority cannot in any way be abdicated to local political bodies and leaders until after appropriate democratic institutions have been set up and the Trusteeship Agreement terminated, all with the approval of the United Nations;

4. *Considers it necessary* that, pending the establishment of popular governments on the basis of the legislative elections to be held in 1961, broad-based caretaker governments be constituted immediately in both parts of the Trust Territory to attend to current affairs of administration and to act in strict conformity with the obligations of the Administering Authority for the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly;

5. *Declares* that it is clearly the obligation and the responsibility of the Administering Authority to create the necessary conditions and atmosphere for the proper conduct of the national elections and not to permit any local authorities to impede the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly;

6. *Decides* that the referendum on the question of the Mwami, contemplated in resolution 1580 (XV), and the legislative elections in Ruanda-Urundi should be held in the month of August 1961 on the basis of direct universal adult suffrage, under the supervision of the United Nations, and that these be organized by the Administering Authority in full consultation with the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, the actual dates to be fixed, after mutual consultation, in the light of the prevailing circumstances;

7. *Decides further* that the questions to be put at the referendum on the question of the Mwami in Ruanda should be the following:

"1. Do you wish to retain the institution of the Mwami in Ruanda?"

"2. If so, do you wish Kigeli V to continue as the Mwami of Ruanda?"

8. *Requests* the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, composed of three members elected by the General Assembly on 20 December 1960, hereafter to be designated United Nations Commissioners, to return to Ruanda-Urundi at the earliest possible time to assist and advise the Administering Authority in the full and proper implementation of resolution 1579 (XV) and the present resolution, and to perform the other tasks entrusted to it;

9. *Notes* the information given by the representative of the Administering Authority concerning measures of amnesty already implemented, and recommends that:

(a) Full and unconditional amnesty, as envisaged in resolution 1579 (XV), be immediately granted by the Administering Authority;

(b) The few remaining cases which, in the Administering Authority's view, are guilty of "very grave crimes" be examined by a Special Commission composed of the representatives of three Member States to be elected by the General Assembly, with a view to securing their re-

lease from prison or return from abroad in the full implementation of the Assembly's recommendation concerning amnesty not later than two months before the national elections;

10. *Notes* the observations contained in paragraphs 199-203 of the interim report of the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi and calls upon the Administering Authority to observe strictly its international obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement;

11. *Requests* the Administering Authority to ensure that the material conditions essential to the successful discharge by the United Nations Commissioners of their responsibilities, such as housing, office space, travel facilities, information and the free use of official broadcasting facilities are provided, and that the local authorities co-operate fully with them;

12. *Requests* the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution to the General Assembly at its sixteenth session;

13. *Decides* to maintain this item on the agenda of the present session, without closing the debate thereon, and authorizes the United Nations Commission for Ruanda-Urundi, in the event that the performance of its duties is hindered through deliberate obstruction or lack of the requisite co-operation from any quarter, to return to Headquarters and request the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the Assembly immediately to consider further measures essential to the discharge of the United Nations obligations with respect to the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi;

14. *Calls upon* the Administering Authority to rescind Legislative Order No. 221/296 of 25 October 1960, so as to ensure that there is no unwarranted interference with the exercise of public freedom and that no persons may be removed or detained without recourse to due process of law;

15. *Reiterates* its conviction that the best future for Ruanda-Urundi lies in the accession of that Territory to independence as a single, united and composite State;

16. *Considers* that the full implementation of all the provisions of the present resolution will enable the General Assembly at its sixteenth session to consider the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement at the earliest possible date.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

Economic Commission for Latin America

The Department of State announced on May 2 (press release 283) that Robert F. Woodward, appointed Ambassador to the Republic of Chile,

* The General Assembly on Apr. 21 appointed Brazil, Canada, and Tunisia as members of the Special Commission.

would serve as acting U.S. representative to the ninth session of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), held at Santiago, May 4-17.

William V. Turnage, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, served as alternate. Advisers to the delegation included:

Thomas R. Favell, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, Santiago

Byron L. Johnson, Assistant Deputy Director for Program, International Cooperation Administration

Michael G. Kelakos, Officer-in-Charge, Economic Affairs, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Ralph C. Korp, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Anthony J. Poirier, Deputy Director, American Republics Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce

Herbert F. Propps, Office of International Trade, Department of State

Edwin C. Rendall, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Department of State

Melvin E. Sinn, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, Department of State

Joseph B. Tisinger III, Second Secretary, American Embassy, Santiago

ECLA, one of the four U.N. regional economic commissions, was established in 1948. It has 24 members—the 21 American Republics, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—and two associate members, British Guiana, and the federation of The West Indies.

The Commission was concerned with a 17-item agenda in the economic, social, and organizational fields, including a report of the third session of the Trade Committee, which met concurrently to consider recent trends in regional Latin American economic integration.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on April 27 confirmed the following nominations:

John A. Calhoun to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chad. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 285 dated May 3.)

U. Alexis Johnson to be Deputy Under Secretary of

State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 280 dated May 2.)

James K. Penfield to be Ambassador to Iceland. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 291 dated May 4.)

Edward J. Sparks to be Ambassador to Uruguay. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 290 dated May 4.)

James Wine to be Ambassador to Luxembourg. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 282 dated May 2.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratification deposited: Malaya, March 28, 1961.

Fisheries

Declaration of understanding regarding the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington April 24, 1961.¹

Signatures: Denmark,² and United Kingdom,³ May 2, 1961; Spain,³ May 5, 1961.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961.¹

Accession deposited: Cyprus, April 24, 1961.

BILATERAL

Germany

Second agreement regarding certain matters arising from validation of German dollar bonds. Signed at Bonn August 16, 1960.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: May 4, 1961.

Greece

Agreement concerning the close-out of the collection accounts of the agricultural commodities agreements of June 24, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3449, 3450, and 3553), August 8, 1956, as supplemented and amended (TIAS 3633, 3741, and 3779), and December 18, 1957 (TIAS 3959). Effected by exchange of notes at Athens April 3 and 13, 1961. Entered into force April 13, 1961.

¹ Not in force.

² Without reservation as to acceptance.

³ Not in force for the United States.

Pakistan

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of April 11, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4470, 4579, and 4720). Effected by exchange of notes at Karachi April 22, 1961. Entered into force April 22, 1961.

Turkey

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of January 11, 1961 (TIAS 4669), with exchange of notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara March 29, 1961. Entered into force March 29, 1961.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4619. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Greece—Signed at Athens November 7, 1960. Entered into force November 7, 1960. With related notes.

Mutual Defense Assistance. TIAS 4620. 4 pp. 5¢.

Understanding between the United States of America and Libya, relating to article XVII of the agreement of September 9, 1954—Signed at Tripoli November 3, 1960. Entered into force November 3, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4621. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey, amending the agreement of December 22, 1959, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara October 22, 1960. Entered into force October 22, 1960.

Technical Cooperation—Cooperative Program of Agriculture and Livestock. TIAS 4622. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Chile, extending and amending the agreement of January 16, 1951, as extended—Signed at Santiago June 15, 1960. Entered into force June 15, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4623. 3 pp. 5¢.

Understanding between the United States of America and Indonesia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta November 5, 1960. Entered into force November 5, 1960.

Utilization of Boundary Waters—Construction of Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande River. TIAS 4624. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Mexico—Signed at Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila, Mexico October 24, 1960. Entered into force October 24, 1960.

Temporary Tracking Station in Magallanes Province. TIAS 4627. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreements between the United States of America and Chile. Exchange of notes—Dated at Santiago March 9

and 28, 1960. Entered into force March 28, 1960. And dated at Santiago November 2 and 12, 1960. Entered into force November 12, 1960.

Canol Project—Disposal of Pipeline Facilities in Canada. TIAS 4631. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 31, 1960. Entered into force March 31, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4632. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Indonesia, amending the agreement of March 2, 1956, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta December 7, 1960. Entered into force December 7, 1960.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 1-7

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to May 1 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 243 of April 21, 253 of April 24, 255, 257, and 260 of April 25, 261 of April 26, 265 of April 27, and 272 of April 28.

No.	Date	Subject
*274	5/1	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†275	5/1	Visit of President of Tunisia (rewrite).
276	5/1	Passamaquoddy tidal power project.
*277	5/1	Cultural exchange (Middle East and Africa).
*278	5/1	Reception for African ambassadors and congressional leaders.
†279	5/2	Delegation to NATO ministerial meeting (rewrite).
*280	5/2	Johnson sworn in as Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs (biographic details).
†281	5/2	Martin: ITU convention and radio regulations.
*282	5/2	Wine sworn in as Ambassador to Luxembourg (biographic details).
283	5/2	Delegation to ninth session of ECLA (rewrite).
*284	5/3	Johnson receives ICA meritorious service award.
*285	5/3	Calhoun sworn in as Ambassador to Chad (biographic details).
286	5/3	Rusk: United States Chamber of Commerce.
287	5/4	Rusk: news conference.
*288	5/6	Smith appointed information coordinator (biographic details).
†289	5/4	Berle: Mississippi Valley World Trade Council.
*290	5/4	Sparks sworn in as Ambassador to Uruguay (biographic details).
*291	5/4	Penfield sworn in as Ambassador to Iceland (biographic details).
†292	5/6	Cleveland: Syracuse University.
†294	5/6	Rowan: "The United States and Revolution."
295	5/6	Vice President's tour of south and southeast Asia.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Africa. Africa—Hopes and Contradictions (Dulles)	767	Laos. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 4 .	756
Agriculture. United States and Morocco Sign Food-for-Peace Agreement	772	Middle East. Central Treaty Organization Holds Ninth Ministerial Meeting (Rusk, text of final communique)	778
American Republics		Morocco. United States and Morocco Sign Food-for-Peace Agreement	772
Alliance for Progress vs. Communism (Berle) . .	763	Mutual Security	
Economic Commission for Latin America (delegation)	788	Africa—Hopes and Contradictions (Dulles) . . .	767
President Calls for IA-ECOSOC Talks to Plan Development in Americas	766	Charting a New Course in Foreign Aid (Rusk) . .	747
U.S. Denies Validity of Alleged "Instruction" Regarding Cuba (text of note)	765	Department Supports Legislation To Amend Battle Act (Ball)	775
Asia. Vice President Johnson to Tour South and Southeast Asia	750	The New Frontier and the New Nations (Ball) . .	751
Atomic Energy. President Comments on Status of Geneva Nuclear Test Ban Talks	755	United States and Morocco Sign Food-for-Peace Agreement	772
Canada. IJC Reports on Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project	772	Non-Self-Governing Territories. Question of the Future of Ruanda-Urundi (Bingham, text of resolution)	785
Central African Republic. President Expresses U.S. Willingness to Aid Central African Republic (Dacko, Kennedy)	766	Presidential Documents	
Communism. Alliance for Progress vs. Communism (Berle)	763	Ambassador Moscoco's Experience Seen Helpful to U.S.-Venezuelan Relations	764
Congo (Léopoldville). General Assembly Adopts New Resolutions on the Congo (Stevenson, texts of resolutions)	781	President Calls for IA-ECOSOC Talks To Plan Development in Americas	766
Congress, The		President Comments on Status of Geneva Nuclear Test Ban Talks	755
Approval Sought for U.S. Acceptance of 1954 Oil Pollution Convention (Chayes)	776	President Expresses U.S. Willingness To Aid Central African Republic	766
Department Supports Legislation To Amend Battle Act (Ball)	775	President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Established	773
Cuba		Publications. Recent Releases	790
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 4 . . .	756	Treaty Information	
U.S. Denies Validity of Alleged "Instruction" Regarding Cuba (text of note)	765	Approval Sought for U.S. Acceptance of 1954 Oil Pollution Convention (Chayes)	776
Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations (Calhoun, Johnson, Penfield, Sparks, Wine) . . .	789	Current Actions	789
Economic Affairs		United Nations	
Approval Sought for U.S. Acceptance of 1954 Oil Pollution Convention (Chayes)	776	General Assembly Adopts New Resolutions on the Congo (Stevenson, texts of resolutions)	781
Department Supports Legislation To Amend Battle Act (Ball)	775	Question of the Future of Ruanda-Urundi (Bingham, text of resolution)	785
Economic Commission for Latin America (delegation)	788	Venezuela. Ambassador Moscoco's Experience Seen Helpful to U.S.-Venezuelan Relations (Kennedy)	764
IJC Reports on Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project	772	Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 4	756
The New Frontier and the New Nations (Ball) . .	751		
Intelligence. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Established (texts of Executive order and letter to Board members)	773		
International Organizations and Conferences			
Central Treaty Organization Holds Ninth Ministerial Meeting (Rusk, text of final communique) .	778		
Economic Commission for Latin America (delegation)	788		
President Calls for IA-ECOSOC Talks To Plan Development in Americas	766		
President Comments on Status of Geneva Nuclear Test Ban Talks	755		

Name Index

Ball, George W	751, 775
Berle, Adolf A	763
Bingham, Jonathan B	785
Bonsal, Philip W	765
Calhoun, John A	789
Chayes, Abram	776
Dacko, David	766
Dulles, Eleanor Lansing	767
Johnson, U. Alexis	789
Kennedy, President	755, 764, 766, 773
Penfield, James K	789
Rusk, Secretary	747, 756, 778
Sparks, Edward J	789
Stevenson, Adlai E	781
Wine, James	789

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